The White Peril 白禍

The US is giving control of some airspace controlled by Yokota Air Force Base back to Japan:

The airspace controlled by the United States will be reduced from the current six areas, which range in altitude from 7,000 meters to 3,700 meters, to five areas with altitudes ranging from 5,500 meters to 2,400 meters, a reduction of more than 20 percent of the current airspace, the sources said.

...

U.S. permission is needed for aircraft to fly through Yokota's airspace. Because of this, flights to and from Haneda and Narita airports usually fly high over the space or detour around it.

In January, the Construction and Transport Ministry said that a 40 percent reduction of Yokota's airspace will benefit the economy to the tune of 19 billion yen annually, due to savings in airline fuel costs.

The partial return, to be accomplished by September 2008, is the first step in the process of giving full airspace control back to Japan. I have no way of knowing how the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport came up with that figure, but airspace around Tokyo is notoriously overcrowded, and from various observation decks around the bay, you can clearly see planes stacked up for landing at Haneda. And though the Yomiuri doesn't mention it, the move would fit into possible plans to make Japan increasingly responsible for its own military defense.

For obvious reasons, everyone is talking about how the PRC has reacted to the DPRK's nuclear test, but it's worth paying attention to the ROK, too:

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun confirmed Friday morning that South Korea will faithfully implement the U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea, which was passed following Pyongyang's nuclear test last week.

Roh made the remark during a meeting with Foreign Minister Taro Aso at the presidential Blue House in Seoul.

However, Roh implied that South Korea would proceed cautiously with the sanction measures. "Each country has final authority over how to interpret the resolution," he said.

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Roh, with an apparent reference to Japan's possible nuclear armament, said to Aso, "There are various debates [in Japan] on how best to respond to North Korea's nuclear test."

Aso countered by saying, "Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe has promised that Japan will uphold the three nonnuclear principles [in which Japan pledges not to produce, possess or allow nuclear weapons into the country]."

Japan has been considering a full-scale cessation of not only imports from North Korea (which have already been implemented) but also exports to it. South Korea's participation in executing UNSC-based sanctions matter, of course, because part of the package is maritime inspections:

In South Korea, criticism of the "sunshine policy" of the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun increased after the nuclear test.

Tokyo and Washington intend to make more efforts to coax the South Korean government over to their side, a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said.

Though the U.N. resolution includes inspection of cargo carried to and from North Korea, the measure cannot be effective unless checks around the Korean Peninsula are intensified.

The key is whether South Korea will participate in and cooperate with the inspection on ships entering and leaving North Korea.

...

Also, while Japan and South Korea regard North Korean nuclear weapons as a direct threat, what the United States fears most is proliferation of the weapons to other parties, such as terrorists.

Joel also posted on more fundamental (and well-recognized) differences in perceptions between the US and the ROK.

It's still not clear what the UNSC statement on the DPRK's nuclear test will say, but here in Japan, the Abe government has voted to suspend imports and port entrances from DPRK vessels:

At a 13 October cabinet meeting, the goverment came to a decision to institute an embargo on imports of all goods from North Korea and prohibit vessels with North Korean registration from entering Japanese ports, as independent sanctions [that is, not in cooperation with the UN or another country--SRK] against the DPRK, which announced that it has conducted a nuclear test. The measures will go into effect at midnight on 14 October and are set to expire in six months.

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Imports from the DPRK consist mostly of agricultural and marine products such as matsutake mushrooms and clams; their total value in 2005 was ¥137 trillion.

DPRK passport holders have been banned from entering Japan since the middle of this week; permanent residents of Japan who happen to be of North Korean extraction aren't affected.

And BTW, for those following the possible evolution of the SDF into a recognized full, standing armed force, Japan may assist the US in freighter inspections:

The government has entered into discussions over providing support and port access to U.S. forces in an effort to assist in the inspection of North Korean freighters, if the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, government sources said Thursday.

Although the government remains cautious over the Self-Defense Forces participating in the inspection of ships, a role supporting U.S. forces' inspection of North Korean ships would be covered by the law concerning Self-Defense Forces operations to assist U.S. forces during emergencies.

The related ministries, agencies and local authorities are expected to begin making arrangements in parallel with the discussions between the central government and the U.S. military, which have already begun.

This would mark the first application of the law since it was enacted in 1999.

The DPRK has reacted to the threat of across-the-board sanctions by stating that it will regard them as (what else?) a declaration of war.

WTF? The US Embassy here in Tokyo sent out a notice to those of us on the mailing list to say that the DPRK's reported nuclear test does not mean that American citizens are at risk in Japan at the moment. Also, the embassy is operating normally.

Can someone give these people a shot of brandy? We're talking about a single test. An important test. A scary test. A test with a lot of implications for regional and global politics. But a test. There's no indication that North Korea has even one deployable nuclear missile, let alone that it's aimed at Japan. I understand the need for caution, but assuring us that the embassy is still open for business seems so...flighty. It makes me wonder whether hysterical expats have been calling and asking whether they need to fly back home. Surely not?

Added later: Okay, I'm a little bit less edgy myself after having dealt with my e-mail backlog. When I went back and reread the message more carefully, I realized it was referring to "health risks"--presumably from the radioactive material that might have been released by the nuclear detonation. That makes a certain amount of sense: yellow dust that drifts over from Chinese industrial cities is a big problem in South Korea and parts of Japan.

Ready to spaz? Okay, good.

The DPRK's central news agency is reporting that its nuclear experiments have been resumed and that it's successfully conducted an implosion test on weapons-grade plutonium:

On 9 October, North Korea announced through the KCNA, that it had conducted a nuclear experiment. It appears that the goal was to push through the test on the day before North Korea's Korean Workers Party's Founding Day [whatever that is in English--SRK] and make a display of the power of the Kim Jong-il regime. "Our scientific research division has conducted underground nuclear experimentation safely and successfully," the report states. It also says, "In these experiments, which were conducted using scientific and meticulous calculations, it was confirmed that there was no danger at all from radiation leakage."

Pyongyang apparently sent word to Beijing less than a half-hour before the test was conducted. There's no substantive reaction from the government here yet.

The timing, especially, throws a wrench into the works because Prime Minister Abe met with PRC President Hu Jintao over the weekend:

During the meeting, Abe urged the Chinese leaders to cooperate with Japan to stop Pyongyang from carrying out the nuclear test. The Chinese side responded that Beijing would pressure Pyongyang to refrain from the test.

As to Pyongyang's nuclear test plan, Abe told Hu, "It is a serious threat to peace and security in the international community and Japan will never tolerate it."

This was Abe's first visit abroad as head of state; that he went to China and not the US is significant. That Japan-PRC relations may thaw, because Hu is willing to give Abe the benefit of the doubt about the Yasukuni Shrine, doubtless worries the DPRK because it needs to maintain its position by playing other parties off each other. It will be interesting to see Beijing's reaction to the announcement, which I haven't heard reported yet.

Prime Minister Abe is headed to China and Korea for state visits:

Just before taking off, Prime Minister Abe spoke to the press corps at Haneda Airport about the issue of Japan's acknowledgement of its history, stating emphatically, "We will act based on humble reflection on the past. I would like to make that the basis of my discussions [with the PRC and ROK] and look toward the future." On the Yasukuni Shrine issue, he stated, "I want to explain that most successive Prime Ministers paid their respects to those who died for their country and that we have made our pilgrimages in a spirit of seeking peace."

Well, since that's the way the issue's been "explained" to the rest of East Asia for years now, I'm not sure what's supposed to make it more persuasive this time--especially since it's now going to be coming a from a known nationalist and apologist for Japan's wartime conduct.

Of course, in that vein, Abe is already maneuvering himself into a public position of greater neutrality:

Abe was asked by Naoto Kan of opposition Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) his views on a statement issued by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on Aug. 15, 1995, marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, in which the government expressed remorse for its military actions during the conflict.

"I have no plans of creating a new statement that would rewrite what the 1995 statement said," Abe said. "That statement was approved by the then Cabinet so it still lives on with my Cabinet." Abe also said that he, as prime minister, and the Cabinet had inherited a 1993 statement issued by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the "comfort women" issue.

Not all his equivocations are politically advantageous:

In a typical Diet exchange Wednesday, Japanese Communist Party lawmaker Tadayoshi Ichida asked Abe about his thoughts on the view of history portrayed at Yasukuni Shrine. "Are you of the opinion that World War II was a war of justice seeking liberation of Asia, as has been argued by Yasukuni Shrine?" Ichida asked.

Abe responded, "While I do not know if Yasukuni Shrine holds to the position that you have just stated, politicians should be humble when talking about the pros and cons of specific views of history."

A stunned JCP leader Kazuo Shii said Abe's understanding of history issues was even more unfathomable than the views expressed by his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi.

"(Abe) did not even say that the stance of his government was different from that of Yasukuni," Shii noted.

Of course, Abe doesn't have to worry much about making the Japan Communist Party happy; it's the PRC that's going to be difficult to mollify. Not that (back to the Nikkei piece) Japan is the only neighbor it's irritated with:

In connection with the DPRK's declaration that it will conduct nuclear experiments, [Abe] indicated that he "want[s] to speak frankly with the Chinese and Korean leaders about the situation. We have to send a message that if North Korea does not stop its nuclear experiments it will be isolated from the international community."

The Abe cabinet has its work cut out for it on military matters. As predicted, it's looking into thinking about Article 9 and how Japan needs to adapt to new realities, including the possibility of collective liberation self-defense missions:

The government's interpretation is that Japan has the right of collective self-defense, but cannot exercise it.

Shiozaki's remark indicated that the government intends to change the conventional interpretation of the right, though it will limit the number of cases in which the right of collective self-defense could be applied.

Shiozaki said: "The security situation in the world is changing, and Japan is urged to make efforts to make the Japan-U.S. alliance work properly. The prime minister's policy on the right of collective self-defense is to again discuss whether the conventional interpretation of the right by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is appropriate in all cases.

New Komeito, the junior coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party, has agreed to studies concerning the right of collective self-defense, but has strongly opposed changing the interpretation to allow the government to exercise the collective self-defense right.

What's mildly alarming about this article is that it mentions interpretation rather than amendment of the constitution. I certainly hope that's not the direction the Abe government plans to pursue. (It wasn't before he was elected.) Interpreting the constitution to mean whatever the current government wants it to mean strikes me as an unwise precedent. I'd much rather see a straightforward amendment.

Japan has its own brewing debate over organ transplantation and how donors and recipients are permitted to find each other. The irritant was this story, which broke a week ago:

Police are seeking to establish a criminal case against an organ donor believed to have collaborated in an illegal kidney transplant for cash.

The 59-year-old female donor posed as a concerned relative of the recipient, Suzuo Yamashita, 59, a fisheries company executive who underwent the transplant at Uwajima Tokushukai Hospital in September 2005, police said.

A third person in the case, Tomoko Matsushita, Yamashita's 59-year-old common-law wife, is believed to have acted as a mediator in the illegal transplant.

Yamashita and Matsushita were arrested Sunday on suspicion of paying money for the donor's kidney. Matsushita is also suspected of brokering the transaction.

Unsurprisingly, that case appears to be part of a pattern:

A number of cases have been discovered in which patients in need of kidney transplants have falsified their relationship with donors to meet the ethical guidelines of the Japan Society for Transplantation, which approves organ transplants between patients and their relatives.

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As the case followed on the heels of another in which a patient married a donor to meet the society's guidelines for transplant, a number of hospitals have set stricter regulations than those of the society to prevent similar incidents.

One of the Nikkei's editorials this morning blames hospitals for not running thorough enough checks:

The hospital and doctors have explained that, once they learned that the sale of an organ [was being conducted], they did not perform the surgery. But doubts remain whether they really had no sense whatever that money was changing hands. Doctors state that their hospital has performed 82 transplants of kidneys from live donors--and this was the single case in which the sale of an organ was involved? Because this case came about through slipshod verification of the donor's identity, it will be necessary to investigate whether the sale of organs took place in other cases.

Organ transplantation is, fundamentally, performed with organs from cadavers; live donorship is considered a last resort. This is because extracting an organ from a healthy person is invasive and therefore not considered optimal. However, in cases of liver or kidney transplants, transplant surgeons rely mostly on live donors. This is because even since the Organ Transplantation Law, which went into effect in 1997, permitted the use of organs from brain-dead donors, there has been a chronic shortage of donated organs. It is clear that this new emphasis on live donorship has been an invitation to the sale of organs.

Well, if you think the brokering of organs isn't happening in Japan, you're probably in need of a brain transplant from a live donor. Back-room dealing is the rule here in plenty of sectors, but health care, with its weird bottlenecks and thickets of rules, is practically begging for it. The Japanese system is great at maintaining a high average life expectancy; but individual experiences with major problems are notoriously uneven, and plain white envelopes full of money are frequently used to smooth the way by those who can afford it. (They often go to the doctors themselves.)

Note, too, that any organs donated by live friends are considered suspect and must be approved by a board; it's not just strangers, but any non-relatives, who should raise the legal alarm. Virginia Postrel has been blogging about the ethics of selling organs for a few months, since she donated a kidney to psychiatrist and journalist Sally Satel. Her latest post on the subject mentions that hospitals in the States are now being less skittish about donors and recipients who hook up on the Internet; but IIRC, an organ donation from a compatible friend has never been a real problem in most cases.

Japan and the US are presenting a united front in threatening economic sanctions if the DPRK resumes nuclear development:

Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Shotaro Taniuchi, now visiting the United States, met with Undersecretary (for Political Affairs) of State Burns at the State Department on 4 October. The two agreed on an approach, in the case of stepped-up nuclear experiments by North Korea, that would involve responding with a proposal for the adoption of restraints through the United Nations Security Council based on Article 7 of the United Nations charter.

What they appear to be seeking is not full-on sanctions (as 制裁 is normally used to mean) but a warning--the usual approach of shoring up the North's ego by making it feel important enough to alarm the great powers in the hopes that it will be mollified into backing off.

BTW, the Asahi English site had this very interesting report about a tentative joint manufacturing project between the DPRK and ROK:

But one recent incident suggests that the fledgling capitalist project may have much more far-reaching repercussions for the totalitarian society than either side envisions.

It started when one of the South Korean firms that runs a factory at Kaesong asked its North Korean employees to work weekends. The workers' leader expressed his opposition, arguing that the employees needed weekends to rest.

But then the employees themselves spoke up and demanded to work weekends.

"Who on Earth will enable us to make money to live?" said one. "We want to work more."

Their leader continued to be reluctant to get the go-ahead from Pyongyang. But the workers wouldn't give up. If their leaders would not speak on their behalf, they would get permission from the government themselves.

The flare-up speaks volumes about the poverty in which North Koreans live. But it also shows the powerful lure of capitalism in a country whose ruling Workers' Party declares itself committed to fighting it tooth and nail.

Kaesong may be funneling money straight to the North Korean government, but there are hints that North Koreans will not want to relinquish what little capitalism they have been given now that they have been given a taste of purchasing power.

The US doesn't like the joint venture, which it alleges (not implausibly) is providing money for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. It does seem to me, though, that the best chance of effecting change in the North Korean state is for enough of its citizens to see how much more prosperity even a modicum of economic liberalization can bring. Of course, it's necessarily providing money for the current regime; but you have to start somewhere.

I also liked this part:

A unique "incentive system" has also sprung up in Kaesong. The Pyongyang administration forbids wage hikes, arguing that low pay is the complex's competitive strength. So instead, employers use things like instant cup noodles, desserts, meat, fabric and small home appliances to keep their workers motivated.

That's unique? It sounds exactly like the methods American employers developed to get around high taxes by providing perquisites instead of pay. And in any case, isn't the money for the cup noodles and appliances coming from somewhere--and being reflected in the selling prices of the goods?

Abe's cabinet line-up was publicized on Tuesday. The Japan Times has an English list attached to its article on the announcement that unfortunately doesn't contain the brief biographies from the print edition. Different commentators have different prognostications to offer, as always, but most agree that what will be most important to pay attention to is how the Abe government decides to prioritize and compromise. The cabinet members and advisors who are personal allies of his are almost uniformly hard-right in their public positions, but much of the rest of the LDP isn't. Besides, some of Abe's policy goals are, on their face, at odds with each other. (I'll be interested to see how he manages to repair relations with China while also scotching its plans to become the preeminent regional economic and political power and increasing Japan's military autonomy.)

Speaking of which, Abe has not stated one way or another whether he plans to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. He was, however, questioned about it this morning:

The first questioner from the Democratic Party of Japan was party leader Yukio Hatoyama, who raised the point that the prime minister is coordinating visits to the PRC and ROK without having stated clearly whether he will make pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine. Hatoyama criticized the prime minister: "This is going to turn into Jun'ichiro Koizumi, the Second Act--losing trust [from China and Korea] through evasive maneuvers."

Touching on the prime minister's [previous] argument that "thinking that requires separating Class-A war criminals from others is off-target," Hatoyama pressed him: "Just where does responsibility lie?"

The second act part is originally 二の舞 (ni no mai: "second dance"), usually used when you fail in the same way as someone else by making the same dumb mistakes. Abe is, if anything, more combative about the Yasukuni issue than his predecessor was. Koizumi's line was, to the extent that one could get meaning from it, that it was possible to pay respect to those who'd served Japan in good faith while leaving the malefactors to whatever reward/retribution had been served to them in the next life.