The White Peril 白禍

"Don't make highway privatization a failure," warns this morning's Nikkei editorial:

The goal of the Japan Highway Public Corporation was to stop building any more pointless expressways and to decrease debt, now at about ¥40 trillion, as quickly as possible. However, there's a slim chance that we can hope for much from the new corporation regarding those items.

The new private corporation holds no capital but will stick the nation with its debt balance. New road construction will also be ultimately decided upon by a state council. In this structure, which will be completely under state protection and governance, there will be almost no elements through which discipline will come into play in operations. Plans for the laying of 9342 kilometers [of new roadway] are for the most part complete, and there is a strong possibility that the resulting ballooning debt will be shunted off onto the next generation.

This new company, with its complete reliance on state support, has also shown its true colors to the market. Top managers have been arrested on suspicion of bid-rigging, and the books show nothing resembling a drop in losses from unprofitable roads. Even under these exigent circumstances, Japan Public Highway Corporation bonds have remained stable in value. It all makes it look unlike a corporation that's about to be privatized.

In a risk-free world, ethical considerations go out the window. At the instruction of the Prime Minister, the Privatization Promotion Committee formed three years ago proposed "complete privatization," by which buy-off of all assets for the privatized corporation would be accomplished in a projected ten years. But LDP Diet members and the heads of regional government bodies violently opposed the proposal, and it was defanged through the machinations of the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Infrastructure and part of the privatization committee. Perhaps because [interested parties] saw this and felt a sense of confidence in their untouchability, it was at this point that large-scale institutionalized bid-rigging really began to effloresce.

The Nikkei editors want Koizumi to use his surge in popular support to make sure the privatization of the highway corporation stands a chance of being a significant part of government finance reform. I don't know--Japan Post (speaking of defanged proposals) and highway construction? He'd have to be a miracle worker.

Good news: Japan can stop worrying about the abductee issue, because the UN has totally told North Korea that it needs to cut it out with the human rights abuses and stuff:

On 27 September, UN Secretary General Annan released a report on humanitarian issues in North Korea and indicated that, in addition to engaging in torture and forced labor, the country was also suffering serious food shortages. About the issue of abducted Japanese nationals, he declared that survivors "must be returned to Japan both swiftly and safely."

The report is 22 pages in all and contains 68 items. About the treatment meted out to citizens who are regarded as criminals by the state, it says, "forced labor is practiced on a large scale." It went on to cite further examples [of problems]: "When a given person is punished for crimes related to politics or ideology, his or her family also becomes a target for punishment."

North Korea's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Annan last week, stressing that the food situation has improved; he sought a cessation of humanitarian aid and cooperation in development projects. However, the new UN report states that aid is [still] necessary, and says, regarding the way support is being used, that "effective monitoring that will increase transparency" is vitally important.

Well, there you go. Problem solved. And some people complain that Japan gets no return on its hefty contributions to the UN!

This (via Joel) is too funny:

For the most part, Japanese network television is pretty darn unremarkable. If one were to flip through the channels at any time of day, one would likely find:

• A variety show featuring a roomful of mindless "talents" who are completely and utterly devoid of any actual talent whatsoever
  
• A cooking program
  
• A cooking program featuring a roomful of mindless talents who watch food being cooked and then sample it and loudly and repeatedly exclaim "OISHII!!!"
  
• Some kind of quiz show
  
• A quiz show featuring a roomful of mindless talents demonstrating just how mindless they truly are
  
• A sappy documentary about someone somewhere in the world who faces some sort of adversity (e.g., is looking for a job, is living in a brutal war zone, was born without legs, a combination thereof, etc.) and who Tries His/Her Best® to overcome the hardships of their situation
  
• A variety show featuring a roomful of mindless talents watching a sappy documentary and providing their horribly forced reactions to the hardships (tears) and the overcoming of the hardships (more tears) for the sake of the television viewers at home who have to be instructed how to react since they have neither souls nor a capacity for empathy

That last sentence is a little over the line, but overall: No fooling! Japanese television does have interesting historical dramas; shows about the country's unique geological features; and profiles of famous artworks and artisans. But it does the lowest-common-denominator thing no less, er, adroitly than American television.

The タレント (tarento: "person who's famous for being famous," derived as Jeff notes from the hilariously inappropriate English word talent) phenomenon has to be seen to be believed. You look at some of these people and think, Maybe we don't need to worry so much about having the US education system outcompeted after all. The guys are unbelievably ditzy--and not in the I-bet-he-makes-up-for-it-by-being-good-with-his-hands way, either. The women, who are encouraged by convention to be slightly flibbertigibbety in public anyway, don't help things much. I saw one quiz show a few years ago on which contestents were asked to locate a few countries on a map of Europe and the Mediterranean, and only one person knew where Germany was. Dead serious.

I'm less in agreement with Conbini Bento about Masaki Sumitami:

Known for his revealing black leather S&M outfit, incessant pelvis-thrusting and frequent exclamations of "WOOO!!!", Hard Gay made a splash on the talent scene earlier this year and has quickly become the man of the moment on Japanese television. Despite his flamboyant personality and outrageous appearance reminiscent of the biker in the Village People, Hard Gay is not only not an actual homosexual, but his forays on television thus far have primarily been based on the wholesome concept of yonaoshi, or social improvement (although in recent appearances he has begun drifting into other territory involving his newfound celebrity). His TV segments usually feature him walking the streets and attempting to help out those he perceives as being in need whilst making jokes rich with pun and innuendo and thrusting his crotch with abandon, often to the horror and embarrassment of the subject(s) of his attention. While his antics may push the envelope at times, Hard Gay's controversial moniker and appearance belie his good humor and affability.

Perhaps I can't get into Sumitami's routine because I've spent too many years running into men in revealing black leather S&M outfits who are actual homosexuals and think that incessant pelvis-thrusting and frequent exclamations of "WOOO!!!" are great ways to hit on guys.

The Japanese government plans to increase its monitoring of the disputed East China Sea oil and gas fields:

The government will strengthen its surveillance apparatus in the maritime region around the East China Sea boundary (Japan-China) where the PRC is furthering its plan to develop gas fields. It will increase the frequency of flights by the Maritime SDF's P3C patrol planes. The Maritime Security Agency and Ministry of Trade, Economy, and Industry are communicating closely with other relevant government bodies to bring the PRC's movements to light down to the last detail. The aim is to preclude China's establishing natural gas production incrementally.

China has already completed development of three fields in the vicinity of the boundary: Tengaiten, Shungyo, and Dankyo. It has also constructed a maritime base for exploratory drilling near Heiko. The China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) will begin production of natural gas from the Shungyo field within the month.

This debate has been brewing for a while. He doesn't update anymore, but Meaty Fly's blog still has a great post up here about the background to the Japan-PRC energy conflict. It's also helpful to bear in mind (via Machiruda a few months ago) that scientists aren't sure just how much gas the most haggled-over field holds.

I think I need to create a category for this, because I'm having serious trouble locating things about it in my own archives.

A friend at the office sent me this WaPo article, the latest installment in the seemingly interminable series in which the Western media treat the funkiest aspects of Japanese culture as if they were poised to become the mainstream by next April. I'm not so sure about the general conclusions that are implied, and I also have to wonder about some of the specifics. It's possible that the reporter, Anthony Faiola, has a lot of experience in Japan, but he doesn't sound that way. I was especially puzzled by this sequence:

On busy Tokyo subways these days, it is not unusual to see men fishing for packs of Virginia Slims cigarettes in European-style male purses. They have many models to choose from at Isetan Men's — the successful 10-story department store in chic west Tokyo that opened two years ago and is now the cathedral of masculine vanity.

The store sells more than 100 types of male purses, including jade-colored alligator clutches and rhinestone-encrusted knapsacks, along with hats with peacock feathers, pink leather card holders and thousands of pieces of exotic designer clothes. Sales have outpaced Isetan's other major Tokyo stores, where the emphasis is on women's apparel, according to company officials.

"On busy Tokyo subways these days"? When I first arrived a decade ago, one of my first questions was, "What is up with all the guys' carrying tote bags and little clutches?" The answer, according to every Japanese person I know, is that those shapes simply don't read as any more femmy than briefcases or backpacks. Plenty of regular, un-fashion-conscious guys with wedding rings carry such bags. The rich ones get them at Vuitton or Coach (or their wives pick them out on their behalf), but they're usually in un-showy neutral colors. With respect to clothes rather than accessories, by contrast, men wear pastels and jewel tones more readily here than they do in the US--you frequently see construction workers swaggering around in lavender or seafoam-green rubber trousers. But that's also a long-standing element in the culture and doesn't signify any new development.

Furthermore, Isetan Men's does have a wide variety of outlandishly colored and over-decorated accessories. They're prominently showcased, which makes every department look as if it catered exclusively to fops, but as someone who shops there, I can tell you that most other guys seem to do what I do: wade through to find the more ordinary stuff. What's great about Isetan Men's is that you have almost ten floors devoted to nothing but men's clothing at your disposal. Like many other high-end stores in Japan, Isetan stocks modestly-priced items along with the sticker-shock brands, so people of a relatively wide range of incomes can shop there. If you want a new jacket, you can look at Brooks Brothers and Ermenegildo Zegna and Theory and Burberrys and a few house labels to be sure you're getting what most pleases you, and you don't have to run all over the place. There's no other store like that for men in Tokyo; there are plenty of stores that cater mostly to women. Therefore, it seems to me that the success of Isetan Men's says at least as much about its lack of competition--its acute exploitation of a niche market that had been hiding in plain sight all along--as it does about men's increased dandyism. (Note also that Atsushi and I frequently see a healthy proportion of guys who have clearly been dragged there by their wives or girlfriends, same as in any other men's department the world over.)

Oh, one last thing: Isetan Men's is literally two blocks from Shinjuku 2-chome, the biggest gay district in the city. It's not at all uncommon for guys to do some shopping before the store closes at 8:00, meet friends for dinner, and then go out for a drink afterward. I've done it myself more times than I can count. Do we have a noticeable effect on the store's total revenue? I don't know. Could we help to explain why it makes business sense to keep pink ostrich-print wallets with marabou-feather trim in stock? It seems to me we could. "Some gay guys like outlandishly attention-getting clothes" is hardly the stuff of news stories, though.

The reason I'm going on about this is that it all makes me wonder whether Faiola can be trusted to read cultural signals competently. The underlying issue he's talking about is certainly real and important: post-War Japan barricaded women in their apartments with the kids and shoved men into the office for twelve-hour days. Now that the national goal of prosperity and respect on the world stage has been achieved, it's natural for people to want to use the resulting wealth to the end of arranging their lives more to their personal liking. The quotation from Negami Kishi lamenting the feminization of Japanese men is used without putting it in this rather obvious context. Of course, when women get a little breathing room, they're going to covet the jobs that have always been available to men; men, in turn, don't want to have to wall themselves off emotionally from everyone including their own children. Since the Japanese have not been socialized to be resilient and resourceful in applying their individual talents and know-how to new situations, the transition has been rocky.

Still, that doesn't mean that the popularity of men's cosmetic surgery and of flamboyantly gay entertainers such as Shogo Kariyazaki means what Faiola seems to think it means. It's worth bearing in mind that Kariyazaki is safely stereotypable: a gay guy with fussy clothes who arranges flowers. His straight male fans don't appear to be imitating his personal style, after all.

And on the subject of cosmetic procedures: hairiness is considered rough and somewhat vulgar by many Japanese. (Sorry, Kyushu and Okinawa boys--I'm just describing other people's opinions here.) As the cost and inconvenience of cosmetic procedures drops, men are getting more of them, as you'd expect. It's not surprising that as advances are made in depilation, specifically, Japanese men are taking advantage of them the way Americans have taken to, say, tooth whitening.

About that whole Koizumi-dancing-with-Richard-Gere thing, I have no comment. I will say that I was shocked that Faiola mentioned Gere and then discussed Dandy House several paragraphs later without mentioning the obvious connection: Gere is featured in the company's latest ad campaign, the billboards for which are INESCAPABLE in Tokyo lately.

Added at 20:55: Okay, I changed the first paragraph to make it a bit less mean-spirited. I don't think most reporters are going around with the intention of making Japan sound like a freakshow. They just don't seem to be able to avoid doing so.

Added on 26 September: I changed a few sentences for clarity. Sheesh, my style is turgid when I'm irritated and writing off the cuff.

Added on 28 September: Thanks to Virginia Postrel for the link. Just to emphasize this again: Faiola is absolutely right to be saying that sex roles are in flux at this historical moment in Japan. In fact, there's very little he wrote that I would actually say is inaccurate. My complaint is with the (mostly implicit) connections he's making and the way he characterizes the larger issue. That Isetan Men's carries shocking pink tote bags doesn't necessarily say anything about Japanese manhood outside an extremely small circle of Tokyo-dwellers.

You know, it's hard to be the DPRK. You send a few test missiles over Japan, you sell some nuke technology on the black market, and all of a sudden, everyone's branding you an aggressor and crap. Luckily, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has the set the UN straight about who the real problem in this part of the world is:

Choe Su-hon, the DPRK Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September, declaring that, because the US is continuing its "policy of hostile regard" and aiming to deliver a nuclear first-strike at North Korea, his country "has no choice but to maintain nuclear deterrance capability for purposes of self-defense, as a method of preserving the dignity and sovereignty of our state."

On the other hand, the Deputy Minister argued that the DPRK's ultimate goal is "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and that it would become unnecessary to possess "even a single nuclear weapon" if relations with the US were normalized. He appealed for...

I can't believe I'm translating this bilge with a straight face.

...[recognition of] the grave necessity of a doctrine of multilateralism with the UN at its core, [as a way of] mindfully taking refuge from the unilateralism and first strikes of the Bush administration, which had invaded Iraq.

Regarding Japan's campaign for permanent membership on the UN Security Council, he emphasized that he sees Japan as refusing to atone for "its past crimes [such as during World War II]" against its neighboring countries, and therefore believes that Japan's request should definitely not be approved.

It may interest people to know that this stuff sounds just as wind-up-lefty and content free in Japanese as in English. What's also interesting is that the word I translated "atone" is 清算 (seisan: "liquidate"), which I've never seen used figuratively. Well, I guess "liquidate" is already figurative, because you don't actually melt assets and pour them away; I've never seen it used outside a financial context. Or maybe I just haven't noticed.

Added at 16:54: Oh, wait--this was the 次官, not the 副官. I called him the "Vice-Minister," who's actually someone else. It's fixed now.

Added still later: Okay, I guess if I see a word used in a way I haven't seen, I could do the normal thing and, like, consult a dictionary. It looks as if 清算 would have been rendered more accurately with something closer to a generalized version of "liquidate," like "deal with conclusively."

Koizumi has reappointed everyone from his previous cabinet for the remainder of the Diet's special session; his predicted reshuffle will be made after the next regular session begins in November.

On the Japan Post privatization, which is the main order of business after the selection of the Prime Minister, the Mainichi has this article, which contributes little new information but has an interesting point buried in it:

The main opposition group, the Democratic Party of Japan, expects to come up with its own counterproposal. But that proposal has been delayed by the disarray in the party following a painful defeat in elections and a change in leadership.

The LDP privatization plan, larded as it is with concessions, has plenty of flaws that the DPJ could be trying to exploit. I doubt that it could somehow come up with arguments powerful enough to counter the Koizumi cabinet's level of public support, but if it started systematically explaining the plan's weaknesses now, it might be able to begin establishing credibility that would help it later. Unfortunately, it has bigger things to worry about, such as, you know, continuing to exist.

Something else that the government has been working on that the Japanese public, if not most international observers, has been paying attention to is the new asbestos victims' compensation bill:

The fund will cover the medical costs of those with mesothelioma, lung cancer and other diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos particles. It will also pay consolation money and cover funeral expenses for family members of those who have died from such diseases.

The bills stipulate that applications for the fund can come from anyone who thinks that his or her disease was caused by asbestos. Family members of workers at factories that used asbestos or those who live near those plants can also apply.

Applications will be accepted at labor standards inspection offices or public health centers, the officials said.

The story has been gaining steam since spring.

It is to be hoped that the asbestos fund won't end up being milked by enterprising false claimants. Cf. today's disclosure about two nuclear power corporations:

The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute were revealed on 22 September to have illegally paid over 120 million yen to employees who were not actually eligible to for benefits for those who work with radiation. There were workplaces in which such illegal disbursement was routine.

From April 2002 to May of this year, the JNC paid out 119.55 million to 604 employees; the JAERI, 9.41 million yen to 113 employees. The greatest amount to a single employee was 600,000 yen. Both organizations will require the employees involved who have not retired to return all the money.

The benefits to those who work with radiation are to be paid when the number of days [a worker] has entered into a radiation control zone exceeds a fixed monthly figure. Payments are made based on the work attendance logs employees keep, but those logs were not systematically verified through comparison with sign-in/sign-out sheets at the radiation control zones.

In this context, the motto displayed on the JNC's website is darkly (radiantly?) comical. It must be very easy to fake 出勤簿 (shukkinbo: "work attendance log") at large companies where payroll is handled far from workstations.

Related Posts (on one page):

1. Insurance rate hikes to fund asbestos payouts
2. Diagnostic criteria for asbestos-related diseases to be fixed
3. Odds and ends
4. Word for the summer: 石綿 （sekimen: "rock" + "cotton" --> "asbestos")

Seiji Maehara's attempt to cobble together a viable party from the tattered DPJ is summarized by the Yomiuri. Among the interesting tidbits to date:

Maehara's appointment of [Yukio] Hatoyama [as secretary general] is expected to be shortly followed by an invitation to [Ichiro] Ozawa to serve as acting president. It is believed the new leader hopes that by including veterans close to Hatoyama and Ozawa he can ensure party unity.

Hatoyama told reporters Sunday he believed the new leader was keen to ensure party unity, but his preferential treatment of midranking and younger members might cause unrest unless all members felt included.

A midranking party member said he thought the appointment of Takeaki Matsumoto, Maehara's fellow national security expert and member of the party's right wing would have an immediate unifying effect once discussion on national security and constitutional reform got under way.

Matsumoto, 46, a Tokyo University law graduate, was elected in the proportional representation bloc for Kinki, the third time he has won a lower house seat since 2000. He had held the positions of Policy Research Committee vice chairman and deputy in the shadow cabinet defense portfolio.

Maehara said in an NHK program Sunday morning that he did not include former SDP lawmakers, who have close relationships with labor unions, because he needed to reconsider the party's relationship with labor unions, especially public-sector ones.

Japan has had its second fugu poisoning death for this year:

The man prepared the puffer fish on Saturday after receiving it from a friend, according to a local public health center. Between about 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. on Sunday, the man ate sashimi from the liver of the fish. At about 11:30 p.m. that evening, he started showing signs of poisoning, and he died in the predawn hours of Monday.

The man had prepared puffer fish in the past, and his family did not stop him from eating it, officials said.

I don't remember having come across the first, but there was a party of four people last year of whom three were poisoned. I think two of them died.

Japan isn't entirely happy with the results of the 6-party talks, however. The abductee problem was basically tabled:

On 19 September, the families of Japanese abducted by the DPRK held a Tokyo press conference in reaction to the joint statement adopted at the 6-party talks, voicing dissatisfaction: "The abduction issue was back-burnered." "This is nothing more than a statement predicated on the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, which is already drained of content."

The only part of the joint declaration to touch on the abduction issue was this: "After dealing appropriately, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, with various pending issues, we will implement a normalization of relations." The vice-representative of the group of families, Shigeo Iizuka (67), made plain his dissatisfaction: "The word abduction doesn't appear in the declaration, and the abduction issue was back-burnered." He indicated further concerns: "If the debate over nuclear issues goes on and on, and and there is no progress seen, the resolution of the abduction issue could become a great deal more difficult."

If you're not familiar with the issue: the DPRK sent agents to the Japanese coast in the 1970s to abduct about a dozen Japanese nationals in their late teens and early 20s. They were brought back to North Korea and forced to teach Japanese language and culture to DPRK spies. Of course, those who are alive are all middle-aged now. The most famous, because her husband happened to be US Army deserter Charles Jenkins, is Hitomi Soga. Their ending was happy: they've come back to Japan and been able to bring their college-age daughters. Other endings have not been happy. Megumi Yokota's family has probably been treated the worst, with the DPRK dismissively shoving random piles of bones at the Japanese as her remains. Other stories are in between. Kaoru Hasuike, for instance, was snatched while on vacation in Hokkaido as a college junior. Having been repatriated at 46, he received permission from his university to complete his degree but was having difficulty deciding on how to proceed--and do you wonder? There are, I think, five of the fifteen abductees accounted for.

For reference, the Ministry of Foreign affairs has the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, from almost exactly two years ago, posted in Japanese and English. The section pertinent to the abduction issue is rendered this way in English:

With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable [遺憾な!--SRK] incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

Well, the DPRK doesn't seem to have abducted anyone lately, but it certainly is maintaining an "abnormal" sense of cooperation. At the same time, it's not hard to understand why the nuclear issue superseded the abductee issue at the 6-party talks. However much the Japanese citizenry feels for the families of the abductees, the fact is that the nuclear problem could directly affect millions of people. The abductee problem, while an outrage, does not. Bilateral negotiations between Japan and the DPRK don't seem to fare much better much of the time, unfortunately, so Iizuka's fears may not be unfounded.

Okay, we'll have to see what actually comes of this, but strictly as a gesture, it's good news:

In a dramatic turn to six-nation negotiations that have been held since 2003, Pyongyang agreed to abandon the weapons and rejoin international arms treaties in exchange for energy assistance from neighboring nations and sovereignty guarantees from the United States.

Japan's envoy to the talks in Beijing, Kenichiro Sasae, said North Korea's nuclear program poses a serious threat to peace in Asia and welcomed Monday's outcome for finally settling on common goals. Most of Japan, the world's second biggest economy and host to about 50,000 U.S. military personnel, lies within range of North Korean missiles.

...

Japan's national broadcaster NHK quoted Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda as calling the agreement a positive step but also saying the nations need to "keep a close eye" on North Korea as negotiations proceed. Hosoda also pressed for a resolution to a dispute about the kidnappings of Japanese nationals by North Korea, calling it a key to improved relations between the countries.

Having to recognize the DPRK's "sovereignty" in any formal way is galling, but it's hardly a change from what we've been doing in practice. Of course, the DPRK is famous for reneging on agreements, so I'm with Hosoda on this one. We'll see.

The Democratic Party of Japan has selected its new top four post-Okada leaders:

The DPJ's leader Seiji Maehara decided on 18 September to tap Yukio Hatoyama as Secretary General, Takeaki Matsumoto as chair of the Policy Research Committee, and Yoshihiko Noda as chair of the Diet Affairs Committee. He gathered his new top three men in the evening, planning to confer about responses to the special Diet session called for 21 September.

Maehara is interesting. It appears that he may do the Clinton-in-1992 thing:

Seiji Maehara, a young conservative, began reshaping the main opposition bloc on Sunday by appointing new officers and outlining plans for a stronger military and smaller spending in a vision that drew comparisons to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's "third-way" government.

Maehara, a 43-year-old defense expert who wants a more assertive role for Japan's military overseas, was narrowly elected a day earlier to head the DPJ, edging aside staid party veteran and co-founder Naoto Kan.

The new leader said Sunday he would re-examine his party's close ties to labor unions, trim wasteful tax spending and push to amend Japan's Constitution so the country's Self Defense Forces would have greater freedom to fight overseas and support its allies. Maehara also wants spending cuts balanced by strong funding for education and other social welfare programs.

Maehara is strong on defense and says Japan's Constitution must clearly give the SDF the right to fight back if attacked and include a new article stipulating its role in aiding allies.

Of course, Clinton wasn't a defense expert. What I'm referring to is more the idea that Maehara is adopting some positions usually associated with those to his party's right while sweetening them with talk about spending on social programs dear to those on his left. Maehara's website has linked, among his writings, this magazine article from November 2001 about Japan's close defense ties with the US, against the backdrop of 9/11. It's lengthy, but one thing that stands out is that Maehara doesn't--or didn't then--see the Japan-US alliance as arising naturally from our similar societies as Koizumi does:

[T]he value of offering visible aid, recognized by the American people, when our ally the US is suffering, does not stop at the psychological; rather, it is also necessary from the viewpoint of risk management regarding the allegiance itself.

It is fine, I believe, for there to be thinking to the effect that we may want to dissolve our relationship as allies, when we take the long-term view. However, at this moment in time, for our allegiance with the US to change character suddenly would most assuredly not work in Japan's national interest.

That seems fair enough. Of course, maybe I'm biased in Maehara's favor because--can I have failed to mention this?--the dude is hot. (He looks better talking than he does in the posed picture on his homepage, but the photo gives you the general idea.) In objective terms, he's probably not too seriously dreamy, but given the milieu in which he operates, he is very easy on the eyes. The rule seems to be that you're not allowed to be a middle-aged Japanese politician until you've survived a near-fatal whupping with the ugly stick. Right after the election, Gaijin Biker was all crowing about how the LDP had hot women and its opponents were guys who needed paper bags over their heads. Understandably, being hetero, he doesn't seem to have noticed that all the guys on the LDP side were no better.

Yes, I can shift in a paragraph from talking about the Japan-US defense partnership to making lustful comments about men. It's a talent. If you'd like to see me do it in a single clause, I'm sure I can arrange that, too.

Anyway, politics, blah, blah...Japundit thought, before the DPJ vote, that Maehara looks as if he needs more seasoning before he's ready to be a serious competitor for Prime Minister:

Maehara appears at first glance as if he will become a viable leader—in five or 10 years. He is obviously intelligent and talented, but still lacks the gravitas people expect from a prime minister. I got the impression that his candidacy was not for this particular election, but for the next one down the road. With his party in desperate straits, however, he might wind up getting chosen prematurely. Let's hope he doesn't have to go on the political version of life support.

Reasonable enough. On the other hand, we're all just guessing. Politics in this media age frequently thrusts people into situations that turn out to be trial by fire. We may find out relatively quickly whether Maehara can make his combination of hawkishness, support for increased social welfare spending, talk about small government, and near-unprecedented level of cuteness potentially media-friendly image connect with Japanese voters.

May I ask a favor of the people who are doing stuff that makes Japan trendy again? Could you knock it off? 'Cause, see, if it becomes too fashionable, I'm going to get all grossed out and have to leave.

I was talking to this guy the other night, and he said something to the effect of, "Well, you certainly chose your specialization well. Japan is hot right now." I didn't quite know how to answer. The dude was a stylist from LA, around my age. He probably wouldn't have found anything odd, bless him, about the idea of choosing a college major in your late teens with the express hope that it would put you at the cutting edge of hip when you were 33.

But I'm more the preserver/custodian type. I was born and brought up in Pennsylvania (long and noble history of contributing to American liberty, but currently declining in relative population and influence). The heaviest cultural influence on our family was my grandfather, who was from England (glorious imperial past now several steps removed from the shabby-genteel present). In college I studied modern Japanese poetry (nothing more recent than the 1930s). After the bubble burst, Japan's HAPPENING! HERE! NOW! cachet was lost to South Korea and China, with Japan taking a forceful but unassuming place as an established economic power. I moved here and felt very at home.

Got it? I like things that are grand and beautiful, but also kind of past-it and mouldering and a bit scuffed up. If other people want to live in thriving boomtowns like...I don't know...Las Vegas, I think that's great. I'm a libertarian; innovation makes it easier for a wide variety of people to have richer, better lives and stuff. I really believe that.

But all this crap about how Gwen Stefani and anime and Beat Takeshi and Koizumi and blah-blah-blah are making Japan cool again is annoying. It is RUINING MY PARTY.

So remember: Japan is tired. Try Vietnamese food. Or Korean soap stars. Or Chinese liquor. Or Thai martial arts movies. You know, Asia's a big continent. Lots to choose from. Just stop telling me how fashionable it is to be a Japanophile before I throw up all over you.

Thanks!

Added on 18 September: Atsushi--who had the rare opportunity not to work until midnight today--pointed out during our phone call tonight that, given Japan's aging society, excessive hipness is not something I'm likely to have to worry about for long. Point taken.

Simon links to an interesting article by Yoichi Funabashi, an Asahi senior correspondent who's now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. It asks the question about how the LDP's landslide relates to China from the opposite direction I've been asking it--namely, how will Koizumi's victory play out in Japan's China policy, and what will that mean as the two countries evolve economically?

Curiously enough, foreign policy was almost totally absent from the pre-election debate. Some may perceive this as a sign that Japan is growing increasingly inward-looking, as Koizumi simply wanted to limit the agenda to the single domestic issue of postal privatization. However, this reading would be wrong. Although very difficult to detect since it was discreetly under the radar, I would nevertheless contend that the China factor was actually one of the largest issues in this election, as more than any other factor, a rising China and its direct challenge to Japan set the context for the debate.

I'm not 100% sure I'm convinced by every jot and tittle that follows, but Funabashi is right in the main. Foreign policy was brought up only by relatively minor opposition parties, and then almost exclusively with reference to the SDF deployment in Iraq and the proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution. Not even specific policy issues that were the subjects of recent flare-ups--such as the disputed fossil fuel fields in the East China Sea--were given attention, let alone the larger question of how Japan intends to maintain its strategic role in a shifting Asia.

One part I'm not sure about--not that I disagree, mark you; I just think it could go either way--is this:

Koizumi's landslide victory may in time prove to be the last gasp of the LDP, as the public likely holds unrealistic expectations of how much Koizumi will be able to accomplish before he steps down next September.

Given their shocked reactions to their own party's staggering victory, that was on minds of quite a few LDP members themselves right after the election, too. I wonder, though. Japan is a conformist society, but the Japanese have personal idiosyncrasies like everyone else. Just about everyone here has had multiple experiences with, say, projects at work that failed because protocol and consensus-building were prioritized over practical decision-making. I think it very possible that Koizumi is clever enough to find a way to blame any further stalling of reforms over the next year on, if not hold-outs in the House of Councillors, then federal bureaucrats. In that case, it could be his successor who's in big trouble and will need to get used to doing a Margaret Thatcher impression.

Funabashi doesn't put it this way, but he does by extension raise another very disturbing question: Is it even possible for Japan to fashion a really workable comprehensive China policy, or have conditions gotten to the point that protecting Japan's interests will mean constantly shifting in response to this week's constellation of trade and cultural conflicts? Remember that you have to factor in (something else Funabashi doesn't weigh) that the US and Japan have become even closer military allies over the last several years. The possibilities are endless. It will be very interesting to see what Koizumi does with his momentum over these next few weeks when the sugar high is over.

Simon links to an interesting article by Yoichi Funabashi, an Asahi senior correspondent who's now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. It asks the question about how the LDP's landslide relates to China from the opposite direction I've been asking it--namely, how will Koizumi's victory play out in Japan's China policy, and what will that mean as the two countries evolve economically?

Curiously enough, foreign policy was almost totally absent from the pre-election debate. Some may perceive this as a sign that Japan is growing increasingly inward-looking, as Koizumi simply wanted to limit the agenda to the single domestic issue of postal privatization. However, this reading would be wrong. Although very difficult to detect since it was discreetly under the radar, I would nevertheless contend that the China factor was actually one of the largest issues in this election, as more than any other factor, a rising China and its direct challenge to Japan set the context for the debate.

I'm not 100% sure I'm convinced by every jot and tittle that follows, but Funabashi is right in the main. Foreign policy was brought up only by relatively minor opposition parties, and then almost exclusively with reference to the SDF deployment in Iraq and the proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution. Not even specific policy issues that were the subjects of recent flare-ups--such as the disputed fossil fuel fields in the East China Sea--were given attention, let alone the larger question of how Japan intends to maintain its strategic role in a shifting Asia.

One part I'm not sure about--not that I disagree, mark you; I just think it could go either way--is this:

Koizumi's landslide victory may in time prove to be the last gasp of the LDP, as the public likely holds unrealistic expectations of how much Koizumi will be able to accomplish before he steps down next September.

Given their shocked reactions to their own party's staggering victory, that was on minds of quite a few LDP members themselves right after the election, too. I wonder, though. Japan is a conformist society, but the Japanese have personal idiosyncrasies like everyone else. Just about everyone here has had multiple experiences with, say, projects at work that failed because protocol and consensus-building were prioritized over practical decision-making. I think it very possible that Koizumi is clever enough to find a way to blame any further stalling of reforms over the next year on, if not hold-outs in the House of Councillors, then federal bureaucrats. In that case, it could be his successor who's in big trouble and will need to get used to doing a Margaret Thatcher impression.

Funabashi doesn't put it this way, but he does by extension raise another very disturbing question: Is it even possible for Japan to fashion a really workable comprehensive China policy, or have conditions gotten to the point that protecting Japan's interests will mean constantly shifting in response to this week's constellation of trade and cultural conflicts? Remember that you have to factor in (something else Funabashi doesn't weigh) that the US and Japan have become even closer military allies over the last several years. The possibilities are endless. It will be very interesting to see what Koizumi does with his momentum over these next few weeks when the sugar high is over.

Another reason to wonder what the PRC thinks about the Koizumi administration's landslide last week is UN Security Council reform, which has been in the news less frequently than before but is still a current issue:

Koizumi, fresh off a landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party in Sunday's parliamentary elections, urged U.N. member nations to work toward a quick decision on an expanded council during the upcoming session of the General Assembly.

"Asia and Africa, once under the shackles of colonialism, are now significant players in our global economy. For the last 60 years, Japan has determinedly pursued a course of development as a peace-loving nation," Koizumi said Thursday. "The composition of the Security Council must reflect these fundamental changes."

The Security Council currently has 15 members. Ten are elected for two-year terms and five permanent members--the United States, Britain, Russia, China and France--have veto power.

Japan has argued that, as the second-largest U.N. contributor after the United States, it deserves a U.N. role more commensurate with its status as the world's second-largest economy.

Japan is contributing US$346.4 million (€281.31 million) this year, nearly 20 percent of the U.N. general budget.

Japanese officials said Thursday they want to open talks next year on paying less--a move that could spur a drawn-out battle with fellow member states.

I'm sure there are people with sincere, high-minded ideas about the "global community" who will find such thinking crass and utterly abominable. Personally, I find it crass and utterly understandable. Whatever you believe its role should ideally be, the UN of reality serves as an influence-peddling bureaucratic machine of globe-buggering dimensions. If Japan is disgorging enough money to cover 20% (20%!) of its general budget, why would it not expect to be in the choicest possible positions to take advantage of the action?

*******

Speaking of wastes of money, if you're sick of the grandiloquent, undersubscribed industrial park you currently own, Osaka Prefecture may be in a position to help:

A 65 billion-yen high-rise is being sold in the bargain basement-at a 93 percent discount.

The 56-story Rinku Gate Town Building opened as a semi-public project in 1996 in southern Osaka Prefecture.

After nine years of losses, it will be sold for a mere 4.5 billion yen, under a plan to rehabilitate its debt-laden operator, partly owned by Osaka Prefecture.

The building was constructed in a waterfront development project that is directly connected by rail and roadway to Kansai International Airport on a manmade island in Osaka Bay.

The office and hotel complex in Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, will be sold to a consortium led by Shinsei Bank for 7 percent of its construction cost.

That will leave a multibillion yen debt with the Osaka prefectural government and local corporate investors-shareholders of the building operator-as well as creditor banks.

According to the rehabilitation plan, the failed Rinku Gate Tower Building Co. will ask creditor banks to forgive 39 billion yen in debt from construction costs.

Osaka Prefecture will be asked to give up 2.2 billion yen it loaned for operating costs.

When other costs are included, the bill for the prefectural government will likely total about 6 billion yen in the next decade.

Oh, too bad. Shinsei Bank beat you to it. Well, at least you're not the Osaka Prefectural Government. Or its taxpayers.

Added: I guess I should point out, before someone does it for me, that that last line is a nice parting shot but is somewhat misleading. The government money that financed the building probably came partially from the Ministry of Construction (which doesn't exist as an individual entity anymore) and may also have come partially from FILP, which was funded by postal savings and insurance deposits. In other words, not only didn't it all come from Osaka, it probably didn't all come from taxes--though, of course, the citizenry ended up paying for it somehow.

These are the sorts of things that take on importance when you live in a society that (1) is aging rapidly and (2) is obsessed with bean counting:

A 110-year-old woman who is ranked 19th on the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry's list of oldest people in the country, which was released Tuesday, may not be alive, although she is still registered with the Arakawa Ward Office in Tokyo.

The ward office has not confirmed she is alive since at least 2002. A ward official admitted, "We automatically put her on the list submitted to the ministry."

The latest finding shocked the ministry because "the incident could shake the credibility of the list of the nation's oldest people." [Stop it! You're killing me!--SRK]

The ministry said it would consider asking the ward authorities to conduct a survey on the elderly in the ward in person.

Soon, you won't count as an elderly citizen without your official "Certified: Not Dead Yet!" badge from the MHLW.

Now, there is a substantive issue lurking here: the possibility that someone is still drawing pension money for a family member who died and thus, obviously, no longer qualifies for it. What's revealing--in addition to hilarious--is that the ministry seems more worried about whether its list of rankings is accurate than about the possibility of fraud, at least as quotations were selected by the Yomiuri. (I wonder, will there be a party in Number 20's honor if she finds out she gets to move up?)

Some of the opponents of Japan Post privatization are forming their own faction in the Diet, or at least proposing doing so:

Legislators who were dropped by the LDP after voting against Japan Post privatization in the ordinary Diet session but managed to win reelection as unaffiliated candidates have begun working toward the formation of a new faction. Takeo Hiranuma stated to the press on 15 September, "If unaffiliated people of the same way of thinking get together, they can form a single new faction." There are, however, those among the unaffiliated legislators who are making moves toward uniting forming a united faction with the People's New Party, so responses may be divided.

Hiranuma is a former Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, BTW. Not a man of mean power and influence.

Ooh, we like the sound of this:

The Japanese and US governments have begun to coordinate efforts to establish the command center for a "Central Rapid Response Team," a division of the Ground Self-Defense Forces to be newly established in 2006 for the purposes of responding to domestic terrorism and contributing to international missions, on the grounds of the US military base Camp Zama (Kanagawa Prefecture). The plan is to rotate the US Army's First Corps command center from US soil to Camp Zama as part of the restructuring of US military deployments. Japan-US military integration looks poised to progress one more step due to the move, in which command functions brought together at Zama will be used to for the counter-terrorism measures of both countries both domestically and in contributing to international efforts.

I'll be interested to see what more we learn about this. Last year, there was the news that the Japanese federal government was asking Israel for help with its domestic counter-terrorism measures. I haven't seen anything about it since then.

The Iraqi foreign minister is formally asking Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura to extend the deployment of non-combat SDF personnel in Iraq:

On 14 September, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Zebari met at the United Nations headquarters in New York; al-Zebari officially requested an extension of the term of the SDF deployment, which ends in December. Machimura responded that Japan will make its decision based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of Iraq's reconstruction. Also, both foreign ministers were in accord about [the need for] close cooperation toward the goal of stability in Iraq.

The Nikkei says that this is the first official request for such an extension made at a meeting, but Koizumi was reporting a few weeks ago that he'd received such a request (by letter, presumably). His response was almost exactly the same as Machimura's, too. It's not clear how much more time al-Zebari asked for. (This year's deployment is already an extension of last year's, BTW.) Of course, in return, Japan has extracted a promise from Iraq to support its bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council.

Results of the Nikkei's latest web-based poll (insert the usual SLOPs caveats here):

On 12 and 13 September, in the wake of the ruling coalition's crushing victory, the Nippon Keizai Shimbun Corporation conducted its fourth Internet poll on the election. Support for the cabinet stands at 54%, 4 points higher than during the last poll just before election day. Support for the LDP is at 45%, an increase of 5 points. Support for the DPJ is reined in at 29% (a 1-point drop). The proportion saying they look forward to the Koizumi administration's tackling the job of improving relations with the PRC, ROK, and other neighboring states reached 69%.

It's helpful to remember that the Nikkei serves a readership that's...well, a lot like me: pro-markets and suspicious of big government. Even within those boundaries, though, I would have been interested to hear what specific China and Korea policies it supported.

Something interesting I haven't seen given much play: how did the PRC react to Koizumi's big win on Sunday? I've been looking and Googling, but I haven't found anything substantive. There's this from Kyodo about a story in a Singaporean newspaper--which is at least part of the Chinese-speaking world. It says the obvious:

The Chinese-language Lianhe Zaobao said Koizumi is expected to become even more powerful after this election and could easily win wide support for his views on controversial issues such as his recurring visits to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine. The controversial shrine honors 14 Class-A war criminals along with 2.47 million war dead.

There's also a translated Xinhua editorial at The People's Daily, but it's pretty muffled, too:

In terms of foreign policies, the LDP noted the need to improve ties with Asian neighbors. Yet, the points was rarely mentioned in Koizumi's campaign speeches.

After the voting, the premier stopped short of dismissing the possibility of paying a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine when he was answering questions on a live program of the public broadcaster NHK.

His repeated visits to the war criminal-enshrining facility was the major stumbling block in relations with China and South Korea.

The Yasukuni Shrine issue causes the greatest number of public snits, but there are more important things to think about, trade and energy policy chief among them. It will be interesting to see, and I'm sure we will after everyone's finished gawking at the numbers and talking about Japan Post privatization.

Just for a sense of perspective, here's the section of the DPJ party platform about Japan-China relations; I have no doubt that strategists in Beijing read it:

The restructuring of Japan-China relations is one of the most important tasks for Japanese diplomacy. [Japan should] build a relationship of trust between the leaders of the two nations, and on that basis, systematize and deepen policy dialogue in fields such as the economy, finance, currency, energy, the environment, maritime activities, and security.

I looked--pretty carefully, I think--but I didn't see anything concrete about the big Japan-PRC sticking points. By contrast, the LDP manifesto contained a blandishment or two about mutual prosperity, but there was also this item among its 120 pledges:

Concerning the Hoppo and Takeshima Islands, we will assiduously pursue a resolution. Further, we will secure the maritime interests of our nation, such as the promotion of the development of natural resources in the East China Sea and surveying of the continental shelf.

I'm sure the Chinese got that message. The Koizumi administration's China policy has, after all, not only included refusal to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine but also threats to do exploratory drilling in disputed undersea oil and gas fields.

Added over cold coffee: I asked Simon whether he'd seen anything in the Chinese media, and this is his answer: Why, no, not much. He also notes that such mention as there has been has focused on the Yasukuni Shrine issue.

Something interesting I haven't seen given much play: how did the PRC react to Koizumi's big win on Sunday? I've been looking and Googling, but I haven't found anything substantive. There's this from Kyodo about a story in a Singaporean newspaper--which is at least part of the Chinese-speaking world. It says the obvious:

The Chinese-language Lianhe Zaobao said Koizumi is expected to become even more powerful after this election and could easily win wide support for his views on controversial issues such as his recurring visits to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine. The controversial shrine honors 14 Class-A war criminals along with 2.47 million war dead.

There's also a translated Xinhua editorial at The People's Daily, but it's pretty muffled, too:

In terms of foreign policies, the LDP noted the need to improve ties with Asian neighbors. Yet, the points was rarely mentioned in Koizumi's campaign speeches.

After the voting, the premier stopped short of dismissing the possibility of paying a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine when he was answering questions on a live program of the public broadcaster NHK.

His repeated visits to the war criminal-enshrining facility was the major stumbling block in relations with China and South Korea.

The Yasukuni Shrine issue causes the greatest number of public snits, but there are more important things to think about, trade and energy policy chief among them. It will be interesting to see, and I'm sure we will after everyone's finished gawking at the numbers and talking about Japan Post privatization.

Just for a sense of perspective, here's the section of the DPJ party platform about Japan-China relations; I have no doubt that strategists in Beijing read it:

The restructuring of Japan-China relations is one of the most important tasks for Japanese diplomacy. [Japan should] build a relationship of trust between the leaders of the two nations, and on that basis, systematize and deepen policy dialogue in fields such as the economy, finance, currency, energy, the environment, maritime activities, and security.

I looked--pretty carefully, I think--but I didn't see anything concrete about the big Japan-PRC sticking points. By contrast, the LDP manifesto contained a blandishment or two about mutual prosperity, but there was also this item among its 120 pledges:

Concerning the Hoppo and Takeshima Islands, we will assiduously pursue a resolution. Further, we will secure the maritime interests of our nation, such as the promotion of the development of natural resources in the East China Sea and surveying of the continental shelf.

I'm sure the Chinese got that message. The Koizumi administration's China policy has, after all, not only included refusal to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine but also threats to do exploratory drilling in disputed undersea oil and gas fields.

Added over cold coffee: I asked Simon whether he'd seen anything in the Chinese media, and this is his answer: Why, no, not much. He also notes that such mention as there has been has focused on the Yasukuni Shrine issue.

Koizumi is still saying that he will play by the rules and step down as Prime Minister in 2006, but there are noises about extending his tenure:

On Sunday, Koizumi reiterated he would step down in September 2006, when his term as LDP president expires, but more and more members of the ruling coalition have floated the idea of possibly extending his term beyond next September.

"That's an important matter we have to think about," LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe said Sunday night about the possible extension.

"The LDP's rule [that Koizumi's term expires next September] is one thing, but on the other hand there's the question of how we should interpret the people's will expressed [in the landslide victory] in this election," said LDP Acting Secretary General Shinzo Abe, who is frequently cited as a possible successor to Koizumi.

New Komeito representative Takenori Kanzaki also hinted his support for extending Koizumi's term. "I'll be speaking about [term extension] on various occasions from now on. Winning this many seats also comes with a certain responsibility for the prime minister," Kanzaki said Sunday.

Yeah, Koizumi has a "certain responsibility," all right. Having finally returned the LDP to complete and utter domination, he's going to have the party leadership anxious to squeeze whatever remaining gains from him it can. It seems to me that, overall, it would be good for him to groom a successor over the next year and leave office as planned. If Koizumi gets through a few more key policy changes and is able to say, next year around this time, "Thank you, Japan, for giving me the opportunity to do my job. It's finished. Time to move on to [say, Abe]," it would help to counter the LDP's image as a party full of people who seek the greatest amount of power they can amass and then keep a death-grip on it well into their dotage.

Speaking of which, people are already starting to say that it's scary that the LDP won so many seats because now it's going to turn into some big, scary juggernaut. Maybe. Let's remember a few things, though: a lot of government power rests in the appointed officials in the federal ministries, and the elected officials know it. And some of the key public employees don't even work for the federal ministries. Recall that one of the toughest parts about getting Japan Post privatization through was the resistance of the postal workers' unions, which threatened not to use their rural outposts to drum up the support of voters for LDP candidates. Koizumi rode into office on a wave of popularity the first time, too; but we all saw soon enough that that wasn't enough for him to get everything he wanted by a long shot.

Hell, the Japan Post privatization package itself has already been watered down considerably; in fact, the watering down started quite a while ago. (Once again, the analogy is not perfect, but check the potential parallels with the California power privatization fiasco.) Koizumi's next project is said to be the integration of the government's two pension systems: the one for civil servants and the one for the rest of us salaried types. Worryingly, he's been quoted as saying, "It will necessary to listen to a variety of opinions while formulating the plan." Sound familiar?

In any case, it is true that the LDP focused hard on Japan Post privatization during the run-up to the election. It's ridiculous, though, to say that that means that voters, in practice, were voting on that single issue and thus can't be said to have expressed support for Koizumi's overall policy platform. Note that, if it's the DPJ we're talking about, its opposition to the LDP's Japan Post scheme was very well-conceived.

No, the Japanese public has not lost its ambivalence toward the SDF deployment in Iraq or the possible amendment of the constitution to allow for combat participation in collective-defense missions. But please. The other parties were all over those issues. They had plenty of opportunities to make their case. Japanese voters, in turn, had the opportunity to, say, vote in a lot of LDP candidates in single-seat districts but "balance" them with more proportional-representation seats from the opposition. They failed to do so. They failed to do so in a big, bad way. They failed to do so even in Tokyo, which is not generally an LDP stronghold. They failed to do so in such a big, bad, Tokyo-included way that it's hard to interpret the election results in any way but that the electorate wants Koizumi and his crew of upstarts to do what they say they're going to do.

Yesterday was the birthday party of a very close friend, so from 19:00 on I was pretty much away from sources of news, except when I talked to Atsushi at midnight-ish. He told me then that it was 自民党大勝利 (jimintou daishouri: "big victory for the LDP"), but I spent the rest of the night carousing and have just awakened.

My loverman was not exaggerating. The ruling coalition won over 300 seats. And the LDP alone--without its coalition partners--has an outright majority:

The 44th lower house general election, in which the major point of contention was which party would control the government, was held on 11 September, with vote counting beginning immediately [after the polls closed]. The LDP won overwhelmingly in both single-seat districts and proportional representation blocs, and together with the Komeito topped 300 seats. It appeared to be an expression of confidence in the trajectory of party president Jun'ichiro Koizumi's reforms, and it is probable that the Japan Post privatization bills will be passed in a special diet session at the end of this month.

...

The LDP will control the chairs of, and won more than the 269 seats necessary to form an absolute majority of members in all of, the lower house's standing committees.

In the morning print edition of the Nikkei, the numbers are updated:

LDP: 295
New Komeito: 30
DPJ: 113
Social Democrats: 6
Communists: 9

The rest of the seats that have been counted went in handfuls to unaffiliated candidates or those with the People's New Party, which was founded by rebel LDP legislators who voted against Japan Post privatization. DPJ leader Katsuya Okada has already announced officially that he's stepping down. Prime Minister Koizumi looks as if he really enjoyed swallowing that canary.

A 2/3 majority! I can't even wrap my head around that--and I like Koizumi and was rooting for him. Of course, there's a lot to think about. The LDP made Japan Post its focal point for the election, but the opposition parties were very vocal about Article 19, the SDF in Iraq, and social welfare policy. Those are issues on which the Japanese are deeply divided, and the election results surely don't signify an unqualified mandate for all aspects of Koizumi's foreign policy. Nevertheless, the voters had a chance to reject the Koizumi government, and it means something that they didn't. (It's worth noting, though, that coalition partner New Komeito is much more pacifist than the LDP--certainly than the Koizumi cabinet--but despite its new dominance in the lower house, the LDP still needs the New Komeito to maintain its upper house majority.)

The English editions of the major dailies have their stories so far here: Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Japan Times. (Does the Sankei even have an English edition?)

Added at 17:11: Another interesting aspect of the snap election was the use of 刺客 (shikaku: "assassin," lit., "specialized stabber") candidates. These were the high-profile candidates fielded by the LDP in single-seat districts against those (formerly) in its own party who had voted against Japan Post reform. Most of the assassin candidates won.

Added at 18:31: Okay, just one more link to the Mainichi, whose English reports are most closely reflecting what we're seeing in non-linkable broadcast media. This one quotes a series of hilariously stunned LDP members all saying, essentially, "Whoa!" The original Japanese article is here, and its lead paragraph is far funnier:

As day broke the morning after lower house election day in the Nagatacho district of Tokyo, the LDP was having an attack of "296-seat shock." "We won so many seats, the prospect of the next election is frightening." With the LDP victorious and jubilant, and the DPJ soundly defeated and dazed, the blessed and the cursed were sharply distinguishable.

BTW, that former cabinet member quoted in the English article actually said this: "勝ったのにどうかと思うけど、怖い。ものが言えなくなってしまう。ファッショだよ。" ("We won, but I wonder whether this is for the best. It's frightening. I'm just dumbstruck. It's fascistic.") Yes, that last sentence is a literal translation, but since the quotation ends there, I'm not sure whether the official was referring to the cult of personality that can be said to surround Koizumi or to the high percentage of seats won or what.

Added at 19:24: Riding Sun calls the success of the Koizumi administration's strategy to field high-profile women candidates a vindication of the "Japanese Babe Theory." I think he's right--it's not a joke. Most of the women "assassins" seemed smart and lively and, dare I say, sassy. They stood in clear visual contrast to the stereotypical LDP politician. At the same time, I believe the move was also smart because the women candidates suggested a connection to the social and family issues--employment and pension figures, especially, but also education and child and elder care--that the party PR machine was deemphasizing but that most voters care the greatest deal about.

I don't want to downplay the capabilities of any of the candidates. They may, in fact, have expertise in hard policy issues that hasn't been given much attention yet. (At least one, Yuriko Koike, has already been Minister of the Environment.) But image matters, especially when the key issue in an election is an unsexy topic such as Japan Post privatization.

NHK's political yak show has all the party leaders on right now, BTW. No one is saying anything even slightly more interesting than you'd expect. Takebe is, of course, in his cool-biz shirt, looking as if he were headed off to the club for a few whiskeys the minute the lights go down; he appears very somber, but maybe he's just tired. Okada has regained some of his color, but of course he looks very unhappy, and it seems somewhat unkind for NHK to be showing him in extreme close-up when he talks.

LOL. Tamisuke Watanuki, a leader of the Japan Post opponents who were abandoned by the LDP, is talking. The expression on Takebe's face across the table! He looks as if he wanted to vault across the studio and throttle him.

Today is the snap election here. We'll see whether Koizumi's conviction that the electorate supports his reforms--or supports the way he's going about them--is justified. Atsushi voted last week while he was here. The street was a madhouse yesterday when I got my haircut. (For those who follow my hair-related travails, yesterday found me being massaged with some cinnamon/ginger-y oil and then washed down with apple-scented shampoo. I half-expected to be loaded onto a platter, garnished with mint leaves, and served for dessert with hard sauce and whipped cream.) The Komeito flacks were, indeed, focusing exclusively on Japan Post privatization as they walked by and shook hands. The communists went by in a van blaring about health care and Article 9. We'll see who gets what when the results come in.

I know that a lot of us are heartily sick of this topic, but for those who can still take it, the following might be instructive.

I write, of course, from Japan. You know, the Japan that makes social-democrat/third-way types feel all warm and fuzzy? The Japan in which enlightened technocrats, enshrined in the federal ministries in Kasumigaseki and insulated from elections and politicking and evil market forces and stuff, guide the nation toward a bright nationally-insured future? Yeah, the bloom is somewhat off the economic rose, but in social policy terms, a lot of my left-leaning acquaintances still swoon over the degree of ministry control here.

Well, I will tell you as someone who has lived here for a decade: what you hear about disaster preparedness ALWAYS involves local intiatives. Sometimes, municipal governments are involved; other times, it's smaller public institutions. 1 September, the anniversary of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, was Disaster Prevention Day here. Apparently, over a million people participated in demonstrations and drills and things. Our apartment building's management company distributed leaflets to our mailboxes, outlining what would happen if a quake hit and our building were declared unsafe until inspection. New survival gadgets are always cropping up in human interest fe