The White Peril 白禍

Poor southwestern Japan, including the prefecture to which Atsushi's been transferred, may have to get back into its typhoon mentality. Well, there's no wind coming, just an early front of 梅雨 (tsuyu: lit., "plum rain," which sounds precious and refreshing but actually refers to the torturing-hot rainy season that makes up the first half of summer here):

The Japan Meteorological Agency has issued a general bulletin related to heavy rains and called for precautions against landslide damage and the swelling of rivers in Kyushu, based on fears that an incoming front of rain, expected to hit the area late tonight, may be dumping 30-50 millimeters of precipitation per hour on some areas by tomorrow.

Some localities are expected to get 80-100 millimeters in the 24 hours leading up to 6 a.m. tomorrow. After that, Kyushu will keep being drenched while Shikoku will join in the fun and be vulnerable to cliffslides and lowland flooding. Of course, my primary concern is that my Atsushi not be washed away, but his city got off rather lightly in last year's typhoon-fest. Other areas that suffered more have probably dried out by now (a big problem toward the end of the season was the cumulative waterlogging of soil to the point that it liquefied), but their enthusiasm for the first wave of tsuyu is probably minimal. Stay safe, if you're down there.

How's that Yasukuni Shrine situation? (I really need to create a sub-category for that....) Well, let's see. The chief of the LDP's Diet committee gives us this solution:

On 29 May, the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party issued another in a series of statements calling for the separate enshrinement of class-A war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine, in response to the controversy over Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi's pilgrimages to the shrine.

Hidenao Nakagawa, head of the LDP's Diet committee, stated on Fuji Television that he is of the opinion that "the administrators of the shrine should meet with the families [of those enshrined], and voluntarily allow for separate enshrinements. Then, China will agree to Japan's assumption of permanent membership to the UN Security Council."

Yes, I'm sure it'll go just like that. The PRC is not, after all, worried about anything other than Japan's attitude toward its wartime conduct, such as--and I'm just kinda riffing here--the entire balance of power in East Asia.

The word I've rendered "voluntarily" there is 自発的 (jihatsuteki: "self-" + "emergence" + [adjectival/genitive ending]). It also often means something closer to "spontaneously," which would perhaps give a better feel for the complete lack of precedent for such a move as Nakagawa is recommending.

Nakagawa isn't the only one issuing unfathomables on this issue. The Yomiuri English edition corrals many of the latest soundbites from various government types, including this "huh?" moment from a Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare official:

Masahiro Morioka, parliamentary secretary of the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry criticized the Chinese government for demanding Koizumi stop visiting the shrine. "Class-A war criminals are treated as bad people because of fear of China," Morioka said. "War criminals were categorized as Class-A, Class-B and Class-C at the Tokyo Tribunal of War Criminals. They were categorized by a one-sided tribunal led by the Occupation forces at which crimes against peace and humanity were created." [It's enough to make you wonder whether this guy might actually be affiliated with the shrine itself.--SRK]

"A war is part of politics, and it is in line with an international law. The Diet unanimously agreed to pay pensions to the families of Class-A war criminals who have died. They're not seen as criminals in the country," he said.

"Saying it's bad to enshrine Class-A criminals at Yasukuni Shrine is to turn a blind eye to future troubles," he added.

It's certainly true that Japan didn't regard many convicted war criminals as actual criminals. It released most (all?) of those who weren't executed; many promptly reentered public service. One, Nobusuke Kishi, became Prime Minister--though it's important to remember that he wasn't one of those tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. BTW, you can read at that last link to get a sense of whether inventive approaches to crime began with the Tribunal and whether it's future troubles to which someone's turning a blind eye.

As you might imagine, others in the government have reacted along predictable lines--namely, "Sh*t! I would just like to distance myself from that particular comment":

Referring to Morioka's remarks, Hosoda said later in the day: "Such remarks should never be made by a member of the government. There were some errors in the judgments, but it's no use to comment on it. Japan accepted [the tribunal's decision]."

Koizumi told reporters at the Prime Minister's Office, "It's meaningless to take note of his remarks. It's got nothing to do with my visits [to Yasukuni Shrine]."

Japan paid the reparations that were demanded of it; the government is absolutely right to maintain that it no longer owes official apologies and official acts of redress. But diplomacy is about establishing, if not trust, at least fellow-feeling. It's not hard to see why China, the Koreas, and Taiwan, suspect there are key members of the Japanese government with no sense of the enormity of their forebears' conduct.

Added at 15:00: Japundit links to a tidbit about this Kyodo poll. It was a telephone poll (heh-heh), so you have to take it FWIW. A few other interesting notes:

Asked about what the Japanese government has done to work toward improvement of Japan-PRC relations, 50.8% of respondents answered, "I don't think it's sufficient," surpassing by a wide margin the 11.5% who answered, "I think it's sufficient."

...

Regarding the bill to privatize Japan Post, over which debate has begun in the Diet, 47.4% supported it, and 33.3% opposed it. However, regarding explanations from the Prime Minister of why the privatization plan was necessary, the proportion saying, "I don't think they're sufficient," reached 64.1%; by contrast, the percent responding, "I think they're sufficient," was 8.2%, so there are still many who feel that not enough explanation has been offered.

The rate of support for the cabinet has risen 1.5 points since Kyodo's April survey to 48.4%, with the percent not supporting the cabinet dropping 1.9 points to 36.4%. Among reasons given for support of the cabinet, the most frequent was "There are no other appropriate people [available]" at 48.7%. The most frequent reason given for withholding support was "Nothing can be expected of its economic policies" at 22.5%.

There was no obvious direct link to Kyodo's report of the poll, so it's hard to tell how much the push for UNSC permanent membership has affected people's attitudes toward China policy.

How's that Yasukuni Shrine situation? (I really need to create a sub-category for that....) Well, let's see. The chief of the LDP's Diet committee gives us this solution:

On 29 May, the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party issued another in a series of statements calling for the separate enshrinement of class-A war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine, in response to the controversy over Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi's pilgrimages to the shrine.

Hidenao Nakagawa, head of the LDP's Diet committee, stated on Fuji Television that he is of the opinion that "the administrators of the shrine should meet with the families [of those enshrined], and voluntarily allow for separate enshrinements. Then, China will agree to Japan's assumption of permanent membership to the UN Security Council."

Yes, I'm sure it'll go just like that. The PRC is not, after all, worried about anything other than Japan's attitude toward its wartime conduct, such as--and I'm just kinda riffing here--the entire balance of power in East Asia.

The word I've rendered "voluntarily" there is 自発的 (jihatsuteki: "self-" + "emergence" + [adjectival/genitive ending]). It also often means something closer to "spontaneously," which would perhaps give a better feel for the complete lack of precedent for such a move as Nakagawa is recommending.

Nakagawa isn't the only one issuing unfathomables on this issue. The Yomiuri English edition corrals many of the latest soundbites from various government types, including this "huh?" moment from a Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare official:

Masahiro Morioka, parliamentary secretary of the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry criticized the Chinese government for demanding Koizumi stop visiting the shrine. "Class-A war criminals are treated as bad people because of fear of China," Morioka said. "War criminals were categorized as Class-A, Class-B and Class-C at the Tokyo Tribunal of War Criminals. They were categorized by a one-sided tribunal led by the Occupation forces at which crimes against peace and humanity were created." [It's enough to make you wonder whether this guy might actually be affiliated with the shrine itself.--SRK]

"A war is part of politics, and it is in line with an international law. The Diet unanimously agreed to pay pensions to the families of Class-A war criminals who have died. They're not seen as criminals in the country," he said.

"Saying it's bad to enshrine Class-A criminals at Yasukuni Shrine is to turn a blind eye to future troubles," he added.

It's certainly true that Japan didn't regard many convicted war criminals as actual criminals. It released most (all?) of those who weren't executed; many promptly reentered public service. One, Nobusuke Kishi, became Prime Minister--though it's important to remember that he wasn't one of those tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. BTW, you can read at that last link to get a sense of whether inventive approaches to crime began with the Tribunal and whether it's future troubles to which someone's turning a blind eye.

As you might imagine, others in the government have reacted along predictable lines--namely, "Sh*t! I would just like to distance myself from that particular comment":

Referring to Morioka's remarks, Hosoda said later in the day: "Such remarks should never be made by a member of the government. There were some errors in the judgments, but it's no use to comment on it. Japan accepted [the tribunal's decision]."

Koizumi told reporters at the Prime Minister's Office, "It's meaningless to take note of his remarks. It's got nothing to do with my visits [to Yasukuni Shrine]."

Japan paid the reparations that were demanded of it; the government is absolutely right to maintain that it no longer owes official apologies and official acts of redress. But diplomacy is about establishing, if not trust, at least fellow-feeling. It's not hard to see why China, the Koreas, and Taiwan, suspect there are key members of the Japanese government with no sense of the enormity of their forebears' conduct.

Added at 15:00: Japundit links to a tidbit about this Kyodo poll. It was a telephone poll (heh-heh), so you have to take it FWIW. A few other interesting notes:

Asked about what the Japanese government has done to work toward improvement of Japan-PRC relations, 50.8% of respondents answered, "I don't think it's sufficient," surpassing by a wide margin the 11.5% who answered, "I think it's sufficient."

...

Regarding the bill to privatize Japan Post, over which debate has begun in the Diet, 47.4% supported it, and 33.3% opposed it. However, regarding explanations from the Prime Minister of why the privatization plan was necessary, the proportion saying, "I don't think they're sufficient," reached 64.1%; by contrast, the percent responding, "I think they're sufficient," was 8.2%, so there are still many who feel that not enough explanation has been offered.

The rate of support for the cabinet has risen 1.5 points since Kyodo's April survey to 48.4%, with the percent not supporting the cabinet dropping 1.9 points to 36.4%. Among reasons given for support of the cabinet, the most frequent was "There are no other appropriate people [available]" at 48.7%. The most frequent reason given for withholding support was "Nothing can be expected of its economic policies" at 22.5%.

There was no obvious direct link to Kyodo's report of the poll, so it's hard to tell how much the push for UNSC permanent membership has affected people's attitudes toward China policy.

JR West, having done some deep thinking, is going to reevaluate its re-education camps...uh, program:

JR West, after last month's derailment disaster in Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture, unveiled the full contents of its new "Plan for Improved Safety" on 28 May. The plan serves as notice to the Ministry of Land, Transport, and Infrastructure what JR West's fundamental policies regarding safety will be from here on. After a comprehensive review of its reeducation program for drivers "Education for Daily Service," which is regarded as "punitive," the company devised a plan the main pillars of which include the generation of consistent internal safety criteria, revision of the qualifications required of those who sit for driver certification exams, and improvements to its packed train schedules.

Alert readers who know the usual line about Japan may be wondering about that "consistent internal safety criteria" part. Japanese corporate culture is highly regimented and group-oriented--doesn't JR West (and everyone else) already have a company-wide set of standards? The answer is no: the Nikkei article goes on to state that the company plans to create its first such manual as a result of the accident. People identify very strongly with their companies, but often there's little horizontal communication within them when doing day-to-day business. Rotations for management trainees expose them to different facets of the operations, but once they start in their designated departments, for example, marketing people may nearly never communicate even with the salespeople in order to coordinate strategies and approaches.

Policy is often set from the details up. You think about all the little things you have to do and problems that might arise and make rules for dealing with them. What it all adds up to kind of becomes the company's set of basic principles by default. Of course, this avoids the Dilbert-style inanity of meaningless mission statements foisted on the rank and file by out-of-touch top managers. But it also creates massive duplication of effort and the frequent possibility that critical information may escape the notice of people who would know what to do about it. There's always the possibility that JR West's new set of standards will end up turning into nothing but an empty gesture, but if the company seriously rethinks how it trains and supports the people running the trains, it will obviously be a good thing.

It's something of a dark relief to read that JAL isn't alone in having some safety concerns recently:

Eight flight crew members and five of their bosses have been punished after most of them were boozing and partying past the time permitted before they were supposed to be on a domestic flight from Akita to Tokyo, All Nippon Airways said.

All 13 were given a reprimand of some sort, with the eight actually drinking -- the flight captain, a co-pilot, a co-pilot trainee and five flight attendants -- served with written warnings. The five others -- the bosses of the crewmembers -- were verbally reprimanded.

ANA regulations forbid flight crew members from drinking within 12 hours of their duties, but the group partied on until just 11 hours before the flight.

Okay, in practice, that's not so bad. 11 hours is more than enough time to sober back up. For those who don't know, this gives an indication of how Japanese people put it away:

The flight captain drank two large jugs of beer and two flasks of sake. Together, the eight members of the flight crew went through two bottles of wine and more than one dozen jugs of beer.

When the captain returned to his hotel, he realized they had been drinking past the time permitted by company regulations. Early on the morning of May 5, he notified ANA staff in Tokyo and the replacement crew were sent up.

So the captain adhered to the letter of the law and followed protocol, even though everyone was probably fine to fly. That's nice to hear, given the way misjudgments by transportation crews have become so prominent in the public mind lately. It'd be even nicer if it were my airline.

There's been basically no news of late about the Japanese man taken captive in Iraq a few weeks back. This morning, the Nikkei passes on a report:

The Iraqi militant group Ansar Sunna, which is believed to have captured Akihiko Saito (44), an employee of a UK-based security company, published sound and video files on its website early this morning that indicate that Saito has been killed. The video includes the corpse of a man who appears Asian and a passport; the Japanese government is hurrying to gather and analyze available information to determine whether the man is Saito.

The video, just under 4 minutes long, shows a short-haired Asian-looking man lying face up and bleeding from the head. He is wearing a black T-shirt and beige trousers. Explanatory subtitles state in Arabic, "This is a tape of a Japanese who was working as a security manager for the US base at Assad. He was captured in a fierce battle with soldiers of the Jihad. He died of multiple bullet wounds."

I assume NHK will have more by evening. Incidentally, the word used to translate jihad here is 聖戦 (seisen: "sacred" + "war"). It's generic enough to refer to the Crusades as well, but the specific word used for them is usually 十字軍 (juujigun: "cross" + "army"). Because the character for 10 (十) is cruciform, they say "shaped like 10." 聖 is one of those characters that are applied to native Japanese words in a way that seems to reveal meaning associations from way, way back. The Japanese reading, kiyo, is frequenty found in names and can also be designated by characters such as 清 ("clear [water]"), 淳 ("ingenuous"), 浄 ("pure"), 潔 ("clean"). Ritual purity is the most important element of sacredness in Japan.

Added on 29 May: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, "There's little choice but to say that this is Mr. Saito."

If you're wondering what Prime Minister Koizumi meant by that comment about Japan's opposition parties yesterday, here's an example:

Debate remained stalled in the Diet on 24 May, as the Democratic (DPJ) and Social Democratic (SDP) Parties, both of which opposed the establishment of a special lower house committee on Japan Post reform, failed to consent to the discussion of any bills. The ruling parties plan to begin debate on the Japan Post privatization bill in the lower house plenary session on 26 May whether the opposition parties agree or not. Ruling and opposition parties will open talks between the chairmen of their Diet committees, but there is little hope that they will find a way out of the impasse.

Koizumi and other higher-ups in the LDP are, of course, taking the opportunity to warn the opposition that the citizenry will not look kindly on this kind of stonewalling. Katsuya Okada of the DPJ has shot back that voters will understand the party's motivations because the bill does not provide a premise for adequate debate. I would say "here we go again," but that would imply that we'd had a respite from this at some point.

That Jun'ichiro can be a real card:

Speculation is spreading within the Japanese government about why PRC Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi actually canceled her meeting with Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi at the last minute and abruptly returned to China.

...

"I don't know why," said the Prime Minister yesterday evening [the day the meeting was to have taken place], addressing the press about Wu's conduct. "I don't know," he repeated seven times, oozing discomfort. "You know, maybe she's been infected by our opposition parties' habit of refusing discussion," he cracked.

The Chinese government has now indicated that the reason for Wu's sudden departure was, indeed, the Yasukuni Shrine issue:

"During Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi's visit to Japan, Japanese leaders made remarks on the Yasukuni Shrine issue that are damaging to China-Japan relations. China is extremely dissatisfied with this," spokesman Kong Quan said in Beijing late Monday.

Kong made the remarks hours after Wu canceled her talks with Koizumi and returned to China for "sudden official duty."

"The Chinese government attaches much importance on China-Japan relations and is continuing efforts to improve and develop ties. Deputy Prime Minister Wu's visit to Japan is part of these efforts," [Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman] Kong said, suggesting that Japan is responsible for her canceled meeting with Koizumi.

The scheduled visit by the PRC's Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi to Prime Minister Koizumi today has been canceled by the Chinese side. LDP leader Shinzo Abe says that Tokyo is not considering it a diplomatic affront:

"If sudden business came up, that can't be helped; however, most Japanese citizens may be left harboring the feeling that they have been treated discourteously," he indicated. At the same time, he expressed an understanding that "the purpose of her visit was to pay her respects; she it not the Prime Minister's counterpart [in rank]. This is not a major problem."

The official reason given was, as Abe referred to, that Wu had business at home that she could not delay attending to. There's been some speculation that the real reason for the cancellation was Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Mainichi reports that a government official (not named) said ofthe cancellation:

"Is it not possible that Ms. Wu canceled her visit because it was conveyed to the Chinese side that, if she raised the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine during their meeting, Prime Minister Koizumi would have no choice but to reply very forcefully that her conduct constituted interference in [Japanese] internal political affairs?" The official was of the view that the Yasukuni Shrine pilgrimage issue was the cause of the cancellation.

Unfortunately, you can't translate 内政干渉 (naisei-kanshou: "inside" + "affairs of state" + "interference") in a way that gets its irritable four-character hissiness across. In any case, China has not been particularly skittish about addressing the issue before. It's one of the reasons visits between the two heads of state have been suspended. There's the possibility that Wu suddenly realized, for whatever reason, that bringing it up on Japan's home turf wasn't a good idea; and "sudden business" certainly sounds like an expedient excuse. President Hu Jintao had no trouble registering his displeasure about the pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine with the chairmen of the LDP and Shin-Komeito.

Earthquake...not a big jolt, but swaying that lasted for a while. As always, I hope it wasn't bigger elsewhere.

The government is putting more diplomatic energy into its push for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. On Monday, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura held a gathering of over 100 sitting Japanese ambassadors--as in, they all met in the same room in Tokyo (Japanese, English):

"In the 60 years since the end of World War II, Japan has played a role as a peaceful nation. With confidence and pride, I want you to persuade key government officials of each country [of the merits of Japan's bid]," Machimura reportedly told the ambassadors, who had been recalled to the ministry in Tokyo.

Machimura also told them that reform of the United Nations, including expansion of the Security Council, was currently "the most important issue for the administration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi."

"Some countries have expressed support for Japan," Machimura said. "But some others are opposing it. And the position of a vast majority of countries remains unknown."

Japan, Brazil, India, and Germany have been preparing a joint proposal for expansion of permanent membership. The NYT reports a bit more on the efforts of the countries other than Japan and has this droll observation:

One reason these leaders may be campaigning on the other side of the world is that, in this effort, no nation can count on its neighbors. Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil. Japan is facing serious opposition from North and South Korea as well as China, where tens of thousands of protesters took part in angry anti-Japan demonstrations last month.

Italy opposes Germany, while Pakistan is trying to block India. And those two countries in opposition, along with South Korea, are leading a counterlobby pushing a proposal that would not award new permanent seats to anyone.

A North Korean ship that runs between Niigata and the DPRK--I think as a combination of ferry and cargo ship--has put in at Niigata for the first time in a while (Japanese, English):

The protesters included members of a group supporting families of Japanese abducted by North Korea, who shouted, "Give us our families back."

It was the first time that the vessel entered a port in Japan since Dec. 1 last year. The entry followed the March enactment of the revised oil spillage compensation security law, which bans entry of ships without expensive shipowners liability insurance.

Initially the Man Gyong Bong had intended to enter the port in April, but the trip was delayed because of the revision to the law.

Later, however, insurance was taken out and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport issued the certificate the ship needed to enter the port.

Not everyone was sad to see the ship:

Officials from the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, however, welcomed the arrival of the vessel.

"We have been looking forward to reuniting with compatriots from our homeland," a member of the association said.

For those who haven't had the pleasure, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (在日朝鮮総連合会: Zainichi-Chousen-Sourengou-kai) does the DPRK's gladhanding here. Technically, Japan doesn't have diplomatic relations with North Korea, but there's still trade. There's also the remittance of funds back home by DPRK nationals, though the nationalizing of Ashikaga Bank a few years ago meant, if I recall correctly, the discontinuation of the only direct banking relationship between the two countries.

Dean has a link to a post that R.J. Rummel just put up about North Korea, which ends this way:

So far, what are the solutions offered: Cozy up to Kim, provide food and material aid, meet with his henchmen one-to-one, then maybe he'll compromise on his development of nukes. Yes, but tell me, how does this help the poor North Koreans suffering this enslavement, and that is what it is, pure and simple slavery under the worst of masters.

I think one of the reasons that the DPRK's internal horrors get so little play (considering their extent) is that they're nearly incomprehensible. In Japan, we fairly often see video from North Korean news--usually, of course, when some Japan-DPRK diplomatic tangle is mentioned. Given the revelations about the abductions of Japanese citizens, the fact that the DPRK tends to fire its test missiles in our direction, and the occasional encounter between ships in the Sea of Japan (the East Sea to Koreans), there are frequent tangles. The first-person stories of Japanese women, often widows of North Korean men, who have escaped and return here, have immediacy and are reported in human-interest features. But those stories come one-by-one; they don't really bring home the scale of the DPRK's malefaction and economic incompetence.

How incompetent? I don't know who wrote this Wikipedia entry, but it appears to be accurate for the most part. One section that I wonder about:

During the early 1970s, North Korea attempted a large-scale modernization program through the importation of Western technology, principally in the heavy industrial sectors of the economy. North Korea found itself unable to finance its debt, because demand for its exports shrank steadily after the oil crisis of the 1970s, until it became the first communist country to default on its loans from free market countries.

That ain't exactly the way I heard it. My understanding has always been that the DPRK waited until Western governments and corporations had coughed up the technology they were to provide to help the country develop--then simply nationalized it and refused to go forward with the planned joint ventures. Or, naturally, to pay off the loans involved. By now, if I recall correctly, the DPRK's yearly volume of foreign trade is considerably lower than the ROK's weekly volume. In fact, that's the stat I learned some time soon after I arrived in Japan. The economy shrank so quickly during the 90's famines that it more or less isn't possible for it to contract further, so who knows what the figure is now?

Tokyo and Pyongyang are only 800 miles apart. That's about the distance between Philadelphia and St. Louis. It's also closer than Sapporo and Fukuoka, the two most far-flung super-sized cities on the Japanese mainland, are from each other. I've often wondered just what the psychological impact will be when the country finally cracks and Western aid workers, investors, and journalists get in and start documenting what they find. A Treblinka with the land area of Mississippi. I doubt we'll be able to wrap our heads around it even then.

Christopher Hitchens's Slate column about North Korea is a good reminder of just how bad things are there (via Downtown Lad). Something struck me as odd, though. He links to a satellite photo showing the differences in nighttime lighting between north and south. The DPRK is way darker, as you'd expect...but it's so completely, unrelievedly dark that I have to wonder. Every single hospital blacked out, for instance? And you can see how blacking out military installations would help keep them from detection, but it also means that soldiers on lookout can't see what they're monitoring.

But even if we assume that the DPRK has managed to effect, through force and the unreliability of its power grid, a blackout of the whole country. the photo should still show at least some lights in Russia and China, right? Northeast Manchuria and Siberia aren't the most population-dense places on Earth...but look at the peninsula right under where it says 40N on the left. That's cut off right at the edge of Dalian, a Chinese city of 3 million people, which is at its tip. The outcropping below it is the Shandong Peninsula, which is also populous. While China may not have become a first-world country yet, I don't think its large northeastern cities are invisible at night. There was a similar photo that made the blog rounds a few years ago that looks more like what you'd expect.

Maybe I just know too little about what things are like in Chinese cities. The Federation of American Scientists, which houses the photo, doesn't seem likely to have doctored it. But the imaging seems to stop northwest of South Korea and Japan. There must be something here I'm missing.

Prime Minister Koizumi delivered a few soundbites at a special meeting of the Lower House budgetary committee this morning. (I think he said these things this morning; the meeting is on NHK now, and I think it's a simulcast.)

About Chinese and Korean criticism of visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, he said, "Any nation will feel the desire to pay respects to its war dead. Other nations should not be interfering based on whether they believe our ways of doing so are desirable."

...

Also, regarding the enshrinement of Class A war criminals at the shrine, Koizumi indicated that his view is that there is no problem because "'one abhores the offense; one does not abhore the person' are the words of China's own Confucius."

I don't think I've ever heard him trot out that one before. It'll be interesting to hear the PRC's reaction.

Other remarks revolved around the proposal to privatize Japan Post. Koizumi stressed that "if the bill is rejected, it is impossible to know what will happen." Regarding who would be held politically responsible if the bill were shot down, he remarked, "Is there any reason that (the cabinet) should resign en bloc? We will fulfill our responsibilities by seeing the bill through to approval; we have no expectation of its rejection."

So that's that, for now. One reason questions about the privatization bill may carry something of a sting right now is that Koizumi has been criticized for giving the heave to two high-ranking bureaucrats who oppose it:

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's decision to remove two top bureaucrats who are vocal opponents of his postal services privatization plan has met with criticism from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on Friday, with party members accusing Koizumi of acting like a tyrant.

...

Koizumi, according to the sources, instructed Internal Affairs and Communications Minister Taro Aso to remove Hiroshi Matsui, the ministry's vice minister for policy coordination, and Hideo Shimizu, director of the postal services policy planning bureau.

...

Another source revealed an incident in winter that foreshadowed the two officials' removal.

"Mr. Matsui, Mr. Shimizu, I'm counting on you both," Koizumi told the two men, who were summoned to the Prime Minister's Office on Feb. 18. The prime minister's exhortation, while sounding like a request for cooperation, was actually a warning that meant "Don't dare stand in my way, you guys," according to an interpretation by a government source.

One LDP member, a former official in the erstwhile Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which is now part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, reacted strongly: "This is a reign of terror. Does anybody have the right to throw people out because they weren't 100 percent behind their master?"

Well, it's true that one doesn't want heads of state in democratic countries ramming through their pet little proposals against the will of the people. But let's not forget that these two are bureaucrats--that is, appointees, and not elected officials. Enforcing accountability on bureaucrats in the various federal ministries and their entourage of semi-public corporations has been one of the biggest problems for reform-minded politicians, let alone their long-suffering constituents.

Whether and how to privatize Japan Post have been debated up, down, around, and through by this point. It doesn't seem unreasonable that, now that a proposal has gelled, two administrators who are staunchly against it should be told that there's no role for them in implementing it. I understand the questions about morale, but I don't think it's possible to take control of a set of wide-ranging and lucrative services away from an organization without making it feel somewhat unloved.

By the way, don't feel too sorry for the two demoted men:

Matsui is expected to remain a vice ministerial-level official, with his former post allocated to Kozo Takahara, vice minister for policy coordination and director of the international affairs department.

Meanwhile, Shimizu will be demoted to director general for policy planning in charge of communications. Yasuo Suzuki, director general for policy planning, will take over the post.

This will not help either's career, of course, but given the power of bureaucrats in Japan--still, for all the noises about reform--both of them have decades of connections and influence to capitalize on.

The Pentagon made some of its recommendations for the restructuring of military installations yesterday:

The Pentagon on Friday recommended closing 33 major domestic U.S. military bases and restructuring 29 others, dealing a hard economic blow to many communities across the country.

New England was the hardest hit region and the South was the biggest gainer. States among the biggest losers were Maine, Connecticut, New Jersey and South Dakota. Winners included Texas, Maryland and Georgia, although the Atlanta area was hit hard.

...

The bases are vital economic engines in many communities, which mounted frantic lobbying efforts to save their local bases, and will now try to convince the commission that the Pentagon erred and to spare ones scheduled to close.

This was the expected reaction, of course; and understandable it is, too. Unfortunately, it's not possible to restructure without reallocating resources (though Japanese companies and government bodies give it the old college try).

Speaking of Japan--do I ever not?--its part in the restructuring is taking shape, also:

Japan and the United States have agreed to step up efforts on joint operations and cooperation in the event of a military emergency in Japan. This would include allowing some Japanese facilities, such as harbors and airports, to be used by the U.S. military.

...

In doing so, Tokyo hopes to strike a deal with Washington to reduce U.S. bases here, sources said.

The plan is part of continuing discussions on the global transformation of the U.S. military.

Japanese and U.S. officials are discussing how to divide the roles and duties of the U.S. military and the Self-Defense Forces.

Military emergencies would include a flare-up between China and Taiwan.

In the event of such a crisis, the government believes that allowing U.S. forces to use civilian facilities would ensure closer mutual cooperation, the sources said.

Under this scenario, Tokyo would offer the use of certain airports and harbors to U.S. forces.

With this offer, Tokyo hopes the Pentagon will become more receptive to eliminating certain U.S. facilities in Japan.

In discussions on cutting the U.S. base presence, Japanese officials have asked that those not in active use be returned to Japan. However, U.S. officials insist the facilities are needed in a military emergency.

Notice, toward the bottom of the article, an indication that one of the problems with this agreement has been the failure of the federal government to coordinate effectively with local governments here in Japan. That sort of thing happens very frequently--it's also been a hilarious coda to the fanfare surrounding the Kyoto Protocols. I point this out not to rag on Japan--every social system of 125 million people is going to have its weak points. It's just that people frequently seem to have the impression that Japanese conformism and the post-War success of Japan, Inc., mean that the government functions like one gigantic well-oiled machine. But you get dissent in the ranks and stonewalling by locals here, too.

On a related note, the joint missile defense system is progressing, but, then, I think it only requires the cooperation of the Defense Agency.

Not many updates on Akihiko Saito, the presumed Japanese abductee in Iraq. The latest Nikkei report I've seen was posted this morning; it contributes no new information other than that his company believes, based on the testimony of eyewitnesses, he may actually have been fatally wounded in the original attack on his convoy. The Mainichi's English version is here.

I got an interesting question from a reader and occasional commenter the other day, asking me to give him the low-down on the political slants of the major Japanese newspapers. What follows is a longer version of the answer I sent him.

Bear in mind that this is my answer based on day-to-day experience, as a non-specialist who's interested in being informed and who talks politics with Japanese friends and hears how they read the same stories I do. I realize that there is more specialized and systematic commentary available on how the Japanese news media function. (The Japan Media Review is typical.) The problem, if you're a general reader, is that they rarely indicate how you can work around the problems.

So this is my workaround. If anyone else with Japan experience thinks I'm full of baloney, I'd be interested to hear.

*******

The straightforward, by-the-book answer to my reader's question is relatively easy. The Nikkei, being concerned with economics/business practicalities, is most politically neutral. The Asahi is leftist (which is handily made easy to remember by the color scheme of its on-line edition). The Sankei is controlled by LDP supporters and tends to parrot the government--one of the interesting backstories behind the controversy over Livedoor's attempt to get a foothold in Fuji Television, which is part of the same conglomerate. The Yomiuri and Mainichi are populist.

I don't think that Japanese journalists are any less able, inquisitive, and intelligent than Western journalists. Most of them probably get into their jobs because they want to tell the public important things and help keep large organizations honest. There are plenty of jobs available in this country for born yes-men; choosing a job that means hiking all over the place and tracking interview subjects down genuinely indicates, I think, a desire to serve the public.

But, of course, politicians and businessmen recognize that the media filter their public image, and they are naturally going to exert all the pressure they can to make sure that image is as sympathetic as it can be. Also, one of the highest values in Japanese culture generally is the avoidance of open conflict; it would be unrealistic to expect journalism to find a magical way of operating outside that.

Put those factors together, and you get cartel-like press clubs and chummy glad-handing with the people whose actions reporters are supposed to be portraying objectively. Young reporters quickly discover that the only thing you make for yourself by being openly skeptical and exposing scandals is trouble. Does this mean that reporters for prestige publications never, ever, ever report the real dirt? Not exactly. What it does mean is this:

The articles in all the major dailies will say almost exactly the same things in their coverage of a political or business controversy. Often, the articles will be so similar as to seem practically interchangeable, because they consist largely of talking points the reporters have been spoon-fed.

You still need to read articles in more than one of the dailies to get a sense of what's going on. Why would that be, if they say the same things? Because they only say almost the same things, and the tiny differences are often the most instructive parts of the articles.

Here's where you need a good eye. They'll agree on the 5 w's + 1 h, and they'll present the same approved line about motivations and goals.

But now look closely. Is there an item that's mentioned, in passing but without development, in only one or two of the articles? That could imply that one particular reporter has managed to ferret out something interesting that's not part of the PR spin. Alternatively, is there an item mentioned in all the articles but, again, in passing and without development? If so, pay attention.

An item that's mentioned glancingly without elaboration may be important later. Japanese news departments don't waste column inches any more than American news departments do. If an item is included without being fleshed out, that usually means that (1) it was important enough to include and (2) the reporter didn't feel free to flesh it out. It will generally be something suggestive--a hint that the MP supporting the new bill has past ties to business interests that would benefit from it, or the barest intimation that someone somewhere is looking into the safety record of the company whose product just caused an accident. Sometimes, it's hardly more than a modifying phrase, but it will be something that makes the skeptical newshound in you say, "Ooh, I wish they'd told me more about that."

You will, in fact, hear more about it. The reporter knows his audience; they read like Japanese people, in full knowledge that surface content is often not to be trusted to express deep truth. For that matter, there may be a veiled message to the figure who's about to be exposed, too: "Be warned that more unsavory types than I are looking into these connections, pal--have the face-saving story ready for your inevitable press conference."

But the major dailies have to retain their prestige, so they almost never feel free to actually break scandals. They have to wait until one of the tabloid weeklies does it, after which talking about the story is no longer taboo, though lots of bet-hedging phrases such as "allegedly" and "it has been speculated" will still be tossed around.

I wish I had a good example of what I'm talking about here--all this is very abstract, and once you get used to it, you don't even realize you're doing it: filing away little clauses that don't fit the tenor of the rest of an article because, in the back of your mind, you know that they could be the stuff of next month's headlines. But the thing is, unless you know more reporters more intimately than most of us do, your only choice is to get what you can from the available, on-the-record media. And, in my experience, this is the way it works.

A Japanese national has been abducted in Iraq, as the Yomiuri's Cairo bureau appears to have found out from Reuters (whose current story on the subject is here). The Asahi gives his name as Akihito Saito.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received word at 5:30 a.m. today from the British security firm Hart Security, Ltd., that Akihiko Saito (44), who was working as a consultant at its Iraq office, has been attacked and that his whereabouts are unknown.

The article says that the report was specifically received by the 対策本部 (taisaku-honbu: "measures [taken in response to a situation]" + "head office"), which is the division of Foreign Ministry headquarters that deals with reports of attacks on Japanese citizens abroad. It's chaired directly by Nobutaka Machimura, the Foreign Minister. Machimura and the Ministry of Defense have stated that they have received no demands from the abductors and that there are no plans to change Japan's Iraq policy in response.

The Asahi reports that the terrorist ("militant" if you're just coming back from the Reuters link and need a minute to adjust) group Ansar al-Sunna has posted an image of Saito's passport on its website and stated that he was seriously injured in an ambush on a vehicle that had just left the Assad US Army Base. Of the 17 people captured, including 12 Iraqis, all but Saito have been killed. (The way it's phrase, it looks as if they were executed after capture, not killed in the attack on the vehicles itself.)

Not all the JR West employees who partied the day of the derailment were so downmarket as to go bowling:

On 6 May, JR West released information that the number of its employees known to have been mindedly involved in inappropriate behavior since the Fukuchiyama Line derailment on 25 April has increased to 185, with approximately 18 new incidents including banquets with liquor and the continuing of golf competitions.

Last night, one of the news programs--I don't even remember which one I was watching, since I was kind of mopey the way I always am when Atsushi takes off--showed some JR West employee around my age apologizing for the bowling party. Presumably, he'd organized it; I didn't catch that part. Having him out front was an interesting gambit, but someone should have prepped him in PR. (Well, he needed some prep in simple morals and ethics, too, but I think the PR problem could have been fixed more quickly.) What he said was, in effect, "We had 35 people invited whose convenience [I think he actually used the word 都合, though I couldn't swear to it] we had to consider." That's great, huh? Picture the headlines the next day: "JR West: Convenience of 35 revelling employees more valuable than lives of 100 dead passengers." They practically write themselves.

The reason I say it was an interesting gambit is that a lot of Japanese people are expressing sympathy with the driver who caused the accident. Sound odd? I think most readers with Japan experience will get it. Look at this from the Mainichi:

Residents and friends of people who died in the horrific JR West train derailment on April 25 that claimed 107 lives have reacted with anger over the train operator's response to the disaster.

Although speed was found to be the deciding cause of the fatal accident, JR West officials initially suggested that the placement of stones on the railway tracks could have caused the collision.

...

Several people who visited a memorial near the accident scene where people lay flowers expressed anger at the railway firm.

"I want JR to become conscious of the 'crime' that it committed. It has done nothing but make excuses," said one 32-year-old woman who was acquainted with a 34-year-old person killed in the accident. "Going bowling is unforgivable. It's inconceivable. I suspect it wasn't the driver, but the people above him who are rotten."

Another 29-year-old resident who was friends with a victim the same age also blasted JR West.

"The driver (of the train that derailed) was also a victim, and it was JR (West) that created those conditions (for the accident to occur)," he said. "Who were they trying to blame with the placement of stones? It's a pathetic company, a really pathetic company."

The Japanese love their country and, in my experience, believe that the cultural tradeoffs their society requires are worth it.

But the strange dance in which a superior orders an inferior to cut corners on quality for the sake of procedure--but covers his own ass and remains unaccountable by not actually spelling out the request--is a familiar one to many workers. "If we all refrain from talking about it, it's not actually happening" is one of the governing rules here. The public is weary from coverups (Mitsubishi Motors, the nuclear power industry) and safety risks (the air system). It's not really surprising that many people are seeing last month's derailment in terms of self-serving, out-of-touch managers squeezing workers on the ground.

It's not fiddling while Rome burns, exactly, but it's not unlike it enough to be very comforting:

On the same day that the Fukushiyama Line derailment occurred, employees of JR West's Tennoji Sector (in Tennoji Ward, Osaka) went to a company bowling party. At least 13 of the 43 who attended (including the chief of the Tennoji Sector) were aware that the derailment has caused multiple fatalities and injuries, an internal JR West investigation has revealed. Of those 13, 5 held an after-party at a bar-restaurant near the sector station.

The last several days of Japanese news reports have been full of top JR West managers expressing sorrow and remorse over the derailment. One scene that was played over and over involved an elderly woman mourner at the makeshift memorial who began to heave and keen with grief; she was comforted by a younger woman who appeared to be her daughter. Immediately after--and I don't think there was a camera cut--a JR West executive was shown bowing tearfully, his mouth working with apology.

Of course, tearful remorse is a highly appropriate posture for a company that has just killed over 100 trusting passengers; indeed, it would be highly appropriate for the tearful remorse to go all the way down. Company policies appear to have encouraged the driver, at least tacitly, to endanger his passengers, and it's possible that those who have been appearing as spokesmen on television are genuinely penitent.

But there is no way in hell that anyone who had seen any 30 consecutive seconds of domestic news coverage after, say, 11:30 a.m. two Mondays ago could possibly have thought that the derailment was a minor accident that was under control. The body count was rising all day, and the aerial footage made it clear that several cars had been crushed.

Of course, this is not the first revelation of shocking behavior by JR West personnel the day of the accident. There were two off-duty drivers on the train that derailed who left the scene to go to work:

The information on the workers' actions comes on the heels of news that two JR drivers were on the Amagasaki train when it derailed and smashed into an apartment block, but they left the scene to go to work as usual without helping any of the victims.

It would have been one thing if fire and rescue workers had told them that they would just be in the way, or if their superiors had ordered them to their posts to ensure that no other passengers were endangered on running train lines; in fact, I'm surprised no one thought to cook up that latter excuse, since the cover-up wouldn't have required anyone outside the company.

And--wouldn't you know it?--the derailment appears to have been a signal for employees at other rail companies to work like gangbusters to convince passengers that last week's accident will not look like a fluke for long. In the past several days, one conductor didn't open the doors properly and then opened them past the platform, and a driver admits that he sailed 170 meters past the platform because he was daydreaming while he was supposed to be applying the brakes!

While my attention has been diverted elsewhere, the Yomiuri has been following the Japan Post privatization proposal through its most recent travails (part 1, part 2, part 3). I'm remiss in not having drawn your attention to it earlier, because it's a very good, accessible summary of where things are at this point. Predictable problems have been cropping up, since the bills have been submitted but have yet to go through the Diet.

Part 2 in the series is the one that has the most concrete information about what's being haggled over. Interestingly, if not exactly surprisingly given the political delicacy of the issue, Heizo Takenaka, who was hand-picked by PM Koizumi to be the minister in charge of orchestrating the Japan Post privatization, has dropped his usual habit of bluntness and bombthrowing and is taking a more oblique line.

One contentious issue is how long the semi-governmental holding company will retain its shares in the four new companies that actually render services (package handling, savings, insurance, and window services). From Koizumi's perspective, the idea is that the holding company is supposed to sell all its shares by 2017. The possibility that has now been raised is that it can buy them back the next year:

LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Kaoru Yosano also said Monday, "The important thing is that the holding company will be a shareholder in 2017 and in 2018 as well."

Once the holding company sells all its shares in the postal savings and insurance companies, they will be considered as private entities, with no restrictions on their operations. If the sale is completed during the early years of the privatization process--which begins in 2007--the firms could take up new profitable businesses, such as lending.

However, such a compromise may have a detrimental impact on existing private operators.

Yes, they might actually have to compete for customers, and, sakes alive, we would NOT WANT THAT.

Personally, I'm kind of wondering what reason a holding company that was incorporated for the express purpose of tiding the four new service companies over during the transition would have for existing after the transition was completed. You can tell I'm not a bureaucrat.

Another, related problem (if you think in terms of free markets) is this:

Also, the government and the LDP have been divided over a fund to be managed by the holding company with the aim of ensuring the uniform provision of postal savings and life insurance services nationwide.

As the relevant bill submitted to the Diet stipulates the holding company can establish a fund of up to 1 trillion yen, the amount of the fund is unchanged from the initial government plan. But the government and the LDP agreed that the company could keep up to 2 trillion yen in the fund.

...

The fund is intended to allow unprofitable post offices to continue providing financial services. The LDP's request to increase its size is aimed at protecting the network of post offices by ensuring the universal service obligation applies not only to mail delivery, but also to banking.

So now we're going to pony up for banking services in every municipality from Chiyoda Ward to darkest Hokkaido, and we're going to insulate the providers from feeling the heat for their bad investment decisions. I doubt it's meant that way, of course; the idea is probably just to help far-flung outlets cover operations costs. But we're talking about a large pile of government-guaranteed money here. You can bet the urn full of grandma's ashes that it won't take long for savvy operators to figure out how to make bad debt and money-pit investments look like the necessary ineffiencies of being the only post office at the top of an underpopulated mountain.

Takenaka, as noted above, is waving all this away:

Heizo Takenaka, the minister responsible for postal privatization, reportedly said he had no intention of revising the bill, and the issue of the fund would be a business decision to be made in the future.

...

The issue could determine the basic scheme of privatization. Takenaka's remark that the issue will be a business decision does not seem to reflect his real intention. Instead, he has just postponed dealing with the issue.

Well, we all know how well it goes when you "privatize" a critical service by creating a soup of government guarantees and nebulous divisions of accountability and just kind of figure that logistics aren't going to interfere, don't we?

This Nikkei headline about the DPRK's missile test yesterday gives some indication of why English translations of Japanese always seem to double the length of the passage in question:

北朝鮮ミサイル実験、日中韓ロと警告へ・米首席補佐官

That 日中韓ロ part in the middle stands for "Japan, China, the ROK, and Russia." The whole thing literally reads, "US Chief of Staff with Japan, PRC, ROK, Russia toward warning on DPRK missile test." Naturalized, it might go, "US to join Japan, PRC, ROK, and Russia in warning DPRK about missile tests, says Chief of Staff."

Anyway, I think yesterday's missile test has been pretty well publicized, and only some fish suffered for it directly. Atsushi thinks the motivation was transferred pain over soccer. He's only half joking.