The White Peril 白禍

Good news: Japan can stop worrying about the abductee issue, because the UN has totally told North Korea that it needs to cut it out with the human rights abuses and stuff:

On 27 September, UN Secretary General Annan released a report on humanitarian issues in North Korea and indicated that, in addition to engaging in torture and forced labor, the country was also suffering serious food shortages. About the issue of abducted Japanese nationals, he declared that survivors "must be returned to Japan both swiftly and safely."

The report is 22 pages in all and contains 68 items. About the treatment meted out to citizens who are regarded as criminals by the state, it says, "forced labor is practiced on a large scale." It went on to cite further examples [of problems]: "When a given person is punished for crimes related to politics or ideology, his or her family also becomes a target for punishment."

North Korea's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Annan last week, stressing that the food situation has improved; he sought a cessation of humanitarian aid and cooperation in development projects. However, the new UN report states that aid is [still] necessary, and says, regarding the way support is being used, that "effective monitoring that will increase transparency" is vitally important.

Well, there you go. Problem solved. And some people complain that Japan gets no return on its hefty contributions to the UN!

You know, it's hard to be the DPRK. You send a few test missiles over Japan, you sell some nuke technology on the black market, and all of a sudden, everyone's branding you an aggressor and crap. Luckily, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has the set the UN straight about who the real problem in this part of the world is:

Choe Su-hon, the DPRK Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September, declaring that, because the US is continuing its "policy of hostile regard" and aiming to deliver a nuclear first-strike at North Korea, his country "has no choice but to maintain nuclear deterrance capability for purposes of self-defense, as a method of preserving the dignity and sovereignty of our state."

On the other hand, the Deputy Minister argued that the DPRK's ultimate goal is "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and that it would become unnecessary to possess "even a single nuclear weapon" if relations with the US were normalized. He appealed for...

I can't believe I'm translating this bilge with a straight face.

...[recognition of] the grave necessity of a doctrine of multilateralism with the UN at its core, [as a way of] mindfully taking refuge from the unilateralism and first strikes of the Bush administration, which had invaded Iraq.

Regarding Japan's campaign for permanent membership on the UN Security Council, he emphasized that he sees Japan as refusing to atone for "its past crimes [such as during World War II]" against its neighboring countries, and therefore believes that Japan's request should definitely not be approved.

It may interest people to know that this stuff sounds just as wind-up-lefty and content free in Japanese as in English. What's also interesting is that the word I translated "atone" is 清算 (seisan: "liquidate"), which I've never seen used figuratively. Well, I guess "liquidate" is already figurative, because you don't actually melt assets and pour them away; I've never seen it used outside a financial context. Or maybe I just haven't noticed.

Added at 16:54: Oh, wait--this was the 次官, not the 副官. I called him the "Vice-Minister," who's actually someone else. It's fixed now.

Added still later: Okay, I guess if I see a word used in a way I haven't seen, I could do the normal thing and, like, consult a dictionary. It looks as if 清算 would have been rendered more accurately with something closer to a generalized version of "liquidate," like "deal with conclusively."

Japan isn't entirely happy with the results of the 6-party talks, however. The abductee problem was basically tabled:

On 19 September, the families of Japanese abducted by the DPRK held a Tokyo press conference in reaction to the joint statement adopted at the 6-party talks, voicing dissatisfaction: "The abduction issue was back-burnered." "This is nothing more than a statement predicated on the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, which is already drained of content."

The only part of the joint declaration to touch on the abduction issue was this: "After dealing appropriately, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, with various pending issues, we will implement a normalization of relations." The vice-representative of the group of families, Shigeo Iizuka (67), made plain his dissatisfaction: "The word abduction doesn't appear in the declaration, and the abduction issue was back-burnered." He indicated further concerns: "If the debate over nuclear issues goes on and on, and and there is no progress seen, the resolution of the abduction issue could become a great deal more difficult."

If you're not familiar with the issue: the DPRK sent agents to the Japanese coast in the 1970s to abduct about a dozen Japanese nationals in their late teens and early 20s. They were brought back to North Korea and forced to teach Japanese language and culture to DPRK spies. Of course, those who are alive are all middle-aged now. The most famous, because her husband happened to be US Army deserter Charles Jenkins, is Hitomi Soga. Their ending was happy: they've come back to Japan and been able to bring their college-age daughters. Other endings have not been happy. Megumi Yokota's family has probably been treated the worst, with the DPRK dismissively shoving random piles of bones at the Japanese as her remains. Other stories are in between. Kaoru Hasuike, for instance, was snatched while on vacation in Hokkaido as a college junior. Having been repatriated at 46, he received permission from his university to complete his degree but was having difficulty deciding on how to proceed--and do you wonder? There are, I think, five of the fifteen abductees accounted for.

For reference, the Ministry of Foreign affairs has the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, from almost exactly two years ago, posted in Japanese and English. The section pertinent to the abduction issue is rendered this way in English:

With respect to the outstanding issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese nationals, the DPRK side confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that these regrettable [遺憾な!--SRK] incidents, that took place under the abnormal bilateral relationship, would never happen in the future.

Well, the DPRK doesn't seem to have abducted anyone lately, but it certainly is maintaining an "abnormal" sense of cooperation. At the same time, it's not hard to understand why the nuclear issue superseded the abductee issue at the 6-party talks. However much the Japanese citizenry feels for the families of the abductees, the fact is that the nuclear problem could directly affect millions of people. The abductee problem, while an outrage, does not. Bilateral negotiations between Japan and the DPRK don't seem to fare much better much of the time, unfortunately, so Iizuka's fears may not be unfounded.

Okay, we'll have to see what actually comes of this, but strictly as a gesture, it's good news:

In a dramatic turn to six-nation negotiations that have been held since 2003, Pyongyang agreed to abandon the weapons and rejoin international arms treaties in exchange for energy assistance from neighboring nations and sovereignty guarantees from the United States.

Japan's envoy to the talks in Beijing, Kenichiro Sasae, said North Korea's nuclear program poses a serious threat to peace in Asia and welcomed Monday's outcome for finally settling on common goals. Most of Japan, the world's second biggest economy and host to about 50,000 U.S. military personnel, lies within range of North Korean missiles.

...

Japan's national broadcaster NHK quoted Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda as calling the agreement a positive step but also saying the nations need to "keep a close eye" on North Korea as negotiations proceed. Hosoda also pressed for a resolution to a dispute about the kidnappings of Japanese nationals by North Korea, calling it a key to improved relations between the countries.

Having to recognize the DPRK's "sovereignty" in any formal way is galling, but it's hardly a change from what we've been doing in practice. Of course, the DPRK is famous for reneging on agreements, so I'm with Hosoda on this one. We'll see.

Simon links to an interesting article by Yoichi Funabashi, an Asahi senior correspondent who's now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. It asks the question about how the LDP's landslide relates to China from the opposite direction I've been asking it--namely, how will Koizumi's victory play out in Japan's China policy, and what will that mean as the two countries evolve economically?

Curiously enough, foreign policy was almost totally absent from the pre-election debate. Some may perceive this as a sign that Japan is growing increasingly inward-looking, as Koizumi simply wanted to limit the agenda to the single domestic issue of postal privatization. However, this reading would be wrong. Although very difficult to detect since it was discreetly under the radar, I would nevertheless contend that the China factor was actually one of the largest issues in this election, as more than any other factor, a rising China and its direct challenge to Japan set the context for the debate.

I'm not 100% sure I'm convinced by every jot and tittle that follows, but Funabashi is right in the main. Foreign policy was brought up only by relatively minor opposition parties, and then almost exclusively with reference to the SDF deployment in Iraq and the proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution. Not even specific policy issues that were the subjects of recent flare-ups--such as the disputed fossil fuel fields in the East China Sea--were given attention, let alone the larger question of how Japan intends to maintain its strategic role in a shifting Asia.

One part I'm not sure about--not that I disagree, mark you; I just think it could go either way--is this:

Koizumi's landslide victory may in time prove to be the last gasp of the LDP, as the public likely holds unrealistic expectations of how much Koizumi will be able to accomplish before he steps down next September.

Given their shocked reactions to their own party's staggering victory, that was on minds of quite a few LDP members themselves right after the election, too. I wonder, though. Japan is a conformist society, but the Japanese have personal idiosyncrasies like everyone else. Just about everyone here has had multiple experiences with, say, projects at work that failed because protocol and consensus-building were prioritized over practical decision-making. I think it very possible that Koizumi is clever enough to find a way to blame any further stalling of reforms over the next year on, if not hold-outs in the House of Councillors, then federal bureaucrats. In that case, it could be his successor who's in big trouble and will need to get used to doing a Margaret Thatcher impression.

Funabashi doesn't put it this way, but he does by extension raise another very disturbing question: Is it even possible for Japan to fashion a really workable comprehensive China policy, or have conditions gotten to the point that protecting Japan's interests will mean constantly shifting in response to this week's constellation of trade and cultural conflicts? Remember that you have to factor in (something else Funabashi doesn't weigh) that the US and Japan have become even closer military allies over the last several years. The possibilities are endless. It will be very interesting to see what Koizumi does with his momentum over these next few weeks when the sugar high is over.

Another reason to wonder what the PRC thinks about the Koizumi administration's landslide last week is UN Security Council reform, which has been in the news less frequently than before but is still a current issue:

Koizumi, fresh off a landslide victory for his Liberal Democratic Party in Sunday's parliamentary elections, urged U.N. member nations to work toward a quick decision on an expanded council during the upcoming session of the General Assembly.

"Asia and Africa, once under the shackles of colonialism, are now significant players in our global economy. For the last 60 years, Japan has determinedly pursued a course of development as a peace-loving nation," Koizumi said Thursday. "The composition of the Security Council must reflect these fundamental changes."

The Security Council currently has 15 members. Ten are elected for two-year terms and five permanent members--the United States, Britain, Russia, China and France--have veto power.

Japan has argued that, as the second-largest U.N. contributor after the United States, it deserves a U.N. role more commensurate with its status as the world's second-largest economy.

Japan is contributing US$346.4 million (€281.31 million) this year, nearly 20 percent of the U.N. general budget.

Japanese officials said Thursday they want to open talks next year on paying less--a move that could spur a drawn-out battle with fellow member states.

I'm sure there are people with sincere, high-minded ideas about the "global community" who will find such thinking crass and utterly abominable. Personally, I find it crass and utterly understandable. Whatever you believe its role should ideally be, the UN of reality serves as an influence-peddling bureaucratic machine of globe-buggering dimensions. If Japan is disgorging enough money to cover 20% (20%!) of its general budget, why would it not expect to be in the choicest possible positions to take advantage of the action?

*******

Speaking of wastes of money, if you're sick of the grandiloquent, undersubscribed industrial park you currently own, Osaka Prefecture may be in a position to help:

A 65 billion-yen high-rise is being sold in the bargain basement-at a 93 percent discount.

The 56-story Rinku Gate Town Building opened as a semi-public project in 1996 in southern Osaka Prefecture.

After nine years of losses, it will be sold for a mere 4.5 billion yen, under a plan to rehabilitate its debt-laden operator, partly owned by Osaka Prefecture.

The building was constructed in a waterfront development project that is directly connected by rail and roadway to Kansai International Airport on a manmade island in Osaka Bay.

The office and hotel complex in Izumisano, Osaka Prefecture, will be sold to a consortium led by Shinsei Bank for 7 percent of its construction cost.

That will leave a multibillion yen debt with the Osaka prefectural government and local corporate investors-shareholders of the building operator-as well as creditor banks.

According to the rehabilitation plan, the failed Rinku Gate Tower Building Co. will ask creditor banks to forgive 39 billion yen in debt from construction costs.

Osaka Prefecture will be asked to give up 2.2 billion yen it loaned for operating costs.

When other costs are included, the bill for the prefectural government will likely total about 6 billion yen in the next decade.

Oh, too bad. Shinsei Bank beat you to it. Well, at least you're not the Osaka Prefectural Government. Or its taxpayers.

Added: I guess I should point out, before someone does it for me, that that last line is a nice parting shot but is somewhat misleading. The government money that financed the building probably came partially from the Ministry of Construction (which doesn't exist as an individual entity anymore) and may also have come partially from FILP, which was funded by postal savings and insurance deposits. In other words, not only didn't it all come from Osaka, it probably didn't all come from taxes--though, of course, the citizenry ended up paying for it somehow.

Ooh, we like the sound of this:

The Japanese and US governments have begun to coordinate efforts to establish the command center for a "Central Rapid Response Team," a division of the Ground Self-Defense Forces to be newly established in 2006 for the purposes of responding to domestic terrorism and contributing to international missions, on the grounds of the US military base Camp Zama (Kanagawa Prefecture). The plan is to rotate the US Army's First Corps command center from US soil to Camp Zama as part of the restructuring of US military deployments. Japan-US military integration looks poised to progress one more step due to the move, in which command functions brought together at Zama will be used to for the counter-terrorism measures of both countries both domestically and in contributing to international efforts.

I'll be interested to see what more we learn about this. Last year, there was the news that the Japanese federal government was asking Israel for help with its domestic counter-terrorism measures. I haven't seen anything about it since then.

The Iraqi foreign minister is formally asking Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura to extend the deployment of non-combat SDF personnel in Iraq:

On 14 September, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Iraqi Foreign Minister al-Zebari met at the United Nations headquarters in New York; al-Zebari officially requested an extension of the term of the SDF deployment, which ends in December. Machimura responded that Japan will make its decision based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of Iraq's reconstruction. Also, both foreign ministers were in accord about [the need for] close cooperation toward the goal of stability in Iraq.

The Nikkei says that this is the first official request for such an extension made at a meeting, but Koizumi was reporting a few weeks ago that he'd received such a request (by letter, presumably). His response was almost exactly the same as Machimura's, too. It's not clear how much more time al-Zebari asked for. (This year's deployment is already an extension of last year's, BTW.) Of course, in return, Japan has extracted a promise from Iraq to support its bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council.

Wind isn't the only thing going in circles around here. The DPRK has announced that it wants to return to 6-party talks on 13 September.